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REVELATION AND REACTION: THE STRUGGLE TO SHAPE AMERICAN
ARBITRATION
By
Thomas J. Stipanowich*
I.

INTRODUCTION
Recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court implicate important

conclusions about the respective domains of courts of law and arbitration
tribunals regarding so-called “gateway” determinations surrounding the
enforcement of arbitration agreements and the contracts of which they are a
part.1 They address the complex interplay between federal substantive law
focusing on questions of arbitrability, a body of law defined and expanded
*

William H. Webster Chair in Dispute Resolution, Professor of Law, Pepperdine
University School of Law; Academic Director, Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution. The
author is grateful for the support and assistance provided by the London office of
WilmerHale, including Gary Born, Dr. Maxi Scherer, Jeremie Kohn, Library and
Information Services Manager Sally Charin, and legal interns Nausheen Rahman and Sadie
Blanchard during the author’s tenure as WilmerHale Scholar-in-Residence (Fall 2010). The
author wishes to thank his valued colleague Gina McCoy, Research Librarian at
Pepperdine School of Law, and Pepperdine law students Chris Herring, Daniel Lockwood,
Li Meng, Maxfield Marquardt and Sara Rosenblit, all of whom assisted with research for
this paper. Finally, he thanks Tom Carbonneau and other participants in the Penn State
Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation 2011 Symposium: The Arbitrator as Judge . . . and
Judge of Jurisdiction, as well as participants in the Fordham International Arbitration
Symposium for their comments and reflections. Unless otherwise noted, of course, the
observations and conclusions are the author’s own. © Thomas J. Stipanowich (2010).
1
In terms of judicial activism the present period is reminiscent of the early 1960s and the
groundbreaking “Steelworker’s Trilogy” of labor arbitration precedents. See United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). It builds directly upon a series of decisions from
another very active period, the mid-1980s, which ushered in a long (and continuing) period
of pro-arbitration jurisprudence characterized by expansive interpretations of the FAA. At
that time the Supreme Court, reinterpreting congressional intent, found that the FAA
created a broad national policy favoring arbitration when parties choose it. See generally
Linda R. Hirschman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration
Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305 (1985) (discussing the broad reach of the FAA resulting from
pro-arbitration Supreme Court jurisprudence).
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by the Court under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the law of the
states. They bring into play competing judicial philosophies of contractual
assent and contrasting views about the balance between policies promoting
the autonomy of contracting parties and judicial policing of overreaching in
the context of contracts of adhesion.
The Court’s decisions reflect the extreme pro-arbitration slant of
recent decades while etching in sharp relief the fault lines that divide the
factions of the Court and the broader American political landscape.2 The
Court’s current jurisprudence, which may be seen as establishing and
expanding a “second tier” of the “revealed” substantive law of arbitrability
under the FAA first given shape and substance in the 1980s,3 is a flashpoint
for special concerns associated with standardized contracts directing
consumers and employees into arbitration. It will inevitably add momentum
to current efforts to enact national legislation outlawing pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in consumer, employment and other classes of
contracts, with possible negative consequences for business-to-business
arbitration.
Part II of this article sets the stage for the discussion of recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence with a short history of the evolution through
Court decisions of the “revelation” and expansion of federal substantive law
under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Parts III and IV discuss recent
Supreme Court cases reflecting the Court’s continuing reliance on this
seemingly inexhaustible wellspring of divined federal law as a basis for
promoting party autonomy in arbitration while limiting lower courts’ ability
2

See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging
and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420 (2008) (discussing
judicial manipulation of arbitration doctrine and the cause-and-effect relationships of
courts, legislatures and other groups within a dynamic system).
3
Hirschman, supra note 1, at 1322-24, 1329-53.
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to police such agreements. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International,4
set against the backdrop of an international commercial contract scheme and
an unusual procedural scenario, limits the ability of arbitrators—or courts—
to promote public policies supporting class actions.5 (Some have read StoltNielsen as a portent of the Court’s likely curtailment of state-law-based
policies against enforcement of contractual waivers of the ability to
participate in a class action when coupled with an agreement to arbitrate.6)
In Rent-A-Center, West v. Jackson,7 entrenched doctrine supporting the
separability of arbitration agreements from the contracts of which they are a
part for the purposes of enforcement under the FAA and the evolving body
of precedents addressing contractual allocation of different decisions at the
“gateway” to arbitration (including issues of the breadth or scope of an
arbitration agreement as well as issues relating to the existence, validity or
enforceability of agreements) are in tension with the authority of courts to
deny or limit the enforcement of arbitration agreements "upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract" under the
rubric of unconscionability.8 Once again, the Court discerns Federal
substantive law surrounding the FAA—this time as a basis for a novel
variation of the separability principle, an aggressive application of court
precedents transferring from courts to arbitrators authority to resolve
4

130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
The class action is a distinctively U.S. phenomenon. It establishes a framework for
bringing a legal cause of action on behalf of a large group of people, or for suit against a
group or class of defendants. See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP
LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987).
6
See, e.g., Richard Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class
Action, NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming) (Vanderbilt Pub. Law Res. Paper No. 10-34,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1670722); Karen Halverson Cross, Letting the
Arbitrator Decide Unconscionability Challenges, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1552966.
7
130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
8
Perry v. Thomas, 482 US 483, 489, 492 n.9 (1987).
5
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enforceability issues, and segregating the determination a contract has been
“made” in a formalistic sense from consideration of defenses to its
enforceability and validity.
Part V briefly explores the dynamic political response to the
extreme, non-nuanced pro-arbitration position developed in modern Court
jurisprudence. After many years in which Congressional inaction has
provided a vacuum giving maximum play to the Court’s expansive
interpretations of the FAA, Congress and the Executive have begun to move
forcefully across a broad front. However, these responses have also tended
to suffer from over breadth and lack of nuance, with potentially undesirable
consequences for commercial arbitration domestically and internationally.
The article concludes by calling for carefully crafted legislation or
administrative regulations limiting the use of arbitration agreements in
adhesion contracts or establishing due process standards for such
agreements. It suggests that process choices should be informed by
dispassionate consideration of the systemic costs and benefits of public and
private approaches, and should avoid unnecessary transaction costs in the
broad realm of business-to-business transactions, especially international
transactions. The result may not be a single solution, but rather several
approaches reflecting the different realities of discrete transactional
systems.
II.

THE WELLSPRING: FEDERAL SUBSTANTIVE LAW
AND ITS PREEMPTIVE EFFECT

UNDER THE

FAA

The current spate of Supreme Court decisions must be understood in the
context of the quarter century of case law interpreting and expanding the umbrella
of the FAA and the associated penumbra of “substantive federal law.” In the mid-
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1980s, the Supreme Court declared the FAA to be a source of “federal substantive
law of arbitrability.”9 An evocation of Congress’ power under the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution,10 the FAA comes into play whenever arbitration
agreements arise in the context of transactions involving interstate commerce—a
truly broad mandate.11 By identifying the FAA as a source of federal substantive
law governing issues of arbitrability, the Supreme Court established its
applicability in state as well as federal courts,12 as well as its power to preempt
contrary state law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.13 In
Southland Corp. v. Keating,14 the Court held that FAA Section 215 preempted a
provision of the California Franchise Investment Law that California courts had
interpreted to require judicial consideration (as opposed to arbitration) of claims
arising under that statute. The Court explained, “In enacting § 2 of the federal Act,
Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration, and withdrew the power
of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”16 Further, “Congress intended
to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration

9

In Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) the Court
stated, “Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the
contrary. The effect of the section is to create a body of federal substantive law of
arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.”
10
Perry, 482 U.S. at 489 (“The Federal Arbitration Act... embodies Congress' intent to
provide for the enforcement of arbitration agreements within the full reach of the
Commerce Clause”).
11
See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-78 (1995).
12
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1984).
13
U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2; Perry, 482 U.S. at 489-92.
14
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
15
9 U.S.C. § 2 (“A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or
an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such
a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”).
16
Keating, 465 U.S. at 10.
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agreements.”17 In the years since Southland the Court has repeatedly asserted
strong pro-arbitration policies under the FAA to enforce arbitration of a wide
spectrum of claims and controversies under federal and state statutes,18
confounding the efforts of state legislatures to prohibit or limit the enforceability
of arbitration agreements in transactions involving interstate commerce.19 In
contrast to the traditional, highly skeptical view of arbitration as a surrogate for
trial embraced in earlier decisions,20 modern Court decision rigorously adhere to
the concept of arbitration as a facially acceptable substitute for a public tribunal. In
the words of the Court, “By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it merely submits their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum.”21

17

Id. at 16.
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 616, 640
(1985), the Court ruled that claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act were arbitrable under
the FAA. The Court reasoned that the arbitral forum provided distinct advantages for many
parties: ‘‘[Arbitration] trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom
for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.’’ Id. at 628. Two years later
the Court held that statutory claims arising under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) are subject to mandatory arbitration. See Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (finding no basis for concluding that
Congress intended to prevent enforcement of agreements to arbitrate RICO claims and
concluding that a RICO claim can be effectively vindicated in an arbitral forum).
McMahon also held that claims under the Securities Act of 1934 are subject to binding
arbitration, rejecting the reasoning of Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953), which held
that claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933 were not subject to binding arbitration.
Not surprisingly, the Court overruled Wilko two years later in Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991), supporting the arbitrability of statutory employment
discrimination claims, narrowed the so-called ‘‘public policy’’ limitation even further.
19
See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687-88 (1996) (enforcing
arbitration agreement in franchise contract, holding FAA preemptive of Montana state law
purporting to regulate the form of arbitration agreements); Bruhl, supra note 2, at 1426-32
(describing Court-directed expansion of FAA).
20
See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 US 427, 435-38 (1953).
21
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628. More recently the Court observed that “[t]he decision to
resolve [statutory claims relating to employment discrimination] by way of arbitration
instead of litigation does not waive the statutory right to be free from workplace age
discrimination; it waives only the right to seek relief from court in the first instance.” 14
Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1459 (2009).
18
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As interpreted by the Court, the FAA Section 2’s “clear federal policy”
required arbitration of disputes falling within the ambit of the statute, save "upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."22 As
we will see, in recent decisions the Court has used the vehicle of federal
substantive arbitration law to severely limit the purview of judicial oversight under
Section 2 and related provisions of the FAA. There is an abiding tension between
the Court’s staunch, expansive pro-arbitration jurisprudence under the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) and concerns about the impact of various terms in
arbitration agreements featured in “contracts of adhesion”23--typically nonnegotiated standardized contracts for consumer sales or service or employment
agreements.

III.

STOLT-NIELSEN
THE WELL

A.

History of the Case
Stolt-Nielsen

S.A.

S.A.

V.

v.

ANIMALFEEDS INTERNATIONAL: BACK

AnimalFeeds

International24

TO

involved

commercial parties unquestionably outside the realm of contractual
adhesion, and, even more curiously, a post-dispute, one-off submission to
arbitration. AnimalFeeds shipped goods under a standard "charter party"
contract that contained an arbitration clause. AnimalFeeds subsequently
brought a class action law suit against Stolt-Nielsen SA and other shipping
companies on the basis that they were engaged in an illegal price-fixing

22

Perry, 482 U.S. at 489.
See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay on Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1173, 1265-66 (1983) (discussing elements of adhesion contracts), discussed infra
note 48.
24
130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
23
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conspiracy.25 The suit was consolidated with similar suits brought by other
charterers, including one in which the Second Circuit overturned a district
court ruling that the charterers' actions were not subject to arbitration.26 The
parties subsequently agreed that as a consequence of these orders, they were
required to arbitrate. AnimalFeeds then served Stolt-Nielsen and the other
defendants with a demand for class arbitration. The parties entered into a
supplemental agreement to submit the [question of class arbitration] to a
panel of three arbitrators who were to address the question under the
American Arbitration Association's Supplementary Rules for Class
Arbitrations (which were developed in the wake of the Court's earlier
decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle27). The parties stipulated
that the arbitration clause was "silent" with respect to class arbitration.28
After hearing arguments and evidence, including expert testimony on
customs and usage in the maritime trade, the arbitration panel ruled that the
language in the charter party permitted AnimalFeeds to proceed with "class
arbitration." The panel found it persuasive that, post-Bazzle, other
arbitrators had construed "a wide variety of clauses in a wide variety of

25

The litigation had begun with a number of suits brought after the defendant shippers
were found by a Justice Department investigation to have engaged in an illegal conspiracy
to fix prices. See Sherman Kahn, Developments in Arbitration: Arbitration at the United
States Supreme Court—October Term 2009, N.Y. DISP. RESOL. L., 12, 13 (2010) available
at
http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/Developments-in-Arbitration-US-SupremeCourt-October-Term-2009.pdf.
26
See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1765; JLM Indus., v. Stolt-Nielsen, S.A., 387 F.3d 163,
183 (2004).
27
539 U.S. 444 (2003).
28
Furthermore, counsel for AnimalFeeds told the arbitration panel that "[a]ll the parties
agree that when a contract is silent on an issue there's been no agreement that has been
reached on that issue." Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1766.
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settings as allowing for class arbitration." Moreover, the defendants had
failed to show an "inten[t] to preclude class arbitration."29
The arbitrators stayed the arbitration proceeding to allow the parties
to seek judicial review. The defendants then filed a petition in district court
to vacate the panel's determination under Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) (authorizing a court to vacate an award on motion
"where the arbitrators exceeded their powers").30
The district court vacated the award on the basis that the arbitrators'
decision was made in "manifest disregard" of the law since they failed to
address the question of choice of law prior to rendering their decision.
AnimalFeeds appealed to the Second Circuit, which reversed, holding that
although the "manifest disregard" standard had indeed survived the
Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,31
as a "judicial gloss" on the statutory grounds for vacatur provided by the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the arbitrators' decision was not in
"manifest disregard" of federal maritime law or New York law, since in
29

Id. at 1775.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).
31
In Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008), Justice Souter's
opinion, joined by five other justices, declared that the grounds for judicial review of
arbitration awards set forth in §§ 10–11 of the FAA are the exclusive sources of judicial
review under that statute. In reaching this conclusion, the Court majority spoke to the
much-cited dictum in a 1953 decision, Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), and declined
to read its reference "manifest disregard of the law" as creating an independent, judiciallydeclared basis for vacatur outside the precise terms of FAA §§ 10–11. The High Court did
not, however, deal a death blow to "manifest disregard" under the FAA, since a lower court
may read the decision as authorizing such inquiries under the specific terms of the FAA.
The Court was not clear about whether there is still room for "manifest disregard" under
the specific terms of the FAA, notably § 10(a)(4). The Court briefly noted, without
comment, that "some courts have thought . . . 'manifest disregard' may have been shorthand
for § 10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4)"; 128 S.Ct. at 1404, and cited the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., 540 U.S. 1098 (2004). In the wake of
Hall Street, some courts have continued to apply the principle with or without reference to
Hall Street. Other courts interpreted the Hall Street decision as eliminating the principle in
cases under the FAA.
30
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neither case was there legal authority establishing a rule against class
arbitration.
B.

The Court’s Decision: Grounding in Federal Substantive Law
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, heard arguments and

rendered a decision reversing the judgment of the Second Circuit. A fivemember majority comprised of Justices Alito, Kennedy, Roberts, Scalia and
Thomas joined in an opinion crafted by Justice Alito. The thrust of the
majority opinion is to shun the rationale of the Bazzle plurality—which had
characterized the question of whether class arbitration is appropriate as a
matter of "procedure" growing out of the dispute.32 Instead, the majority
grounds its decision on Supreme Court "precedents [under the FAA]
emphasizing the consensual basis of arbitration."33 The majority thus brings
into play the body of substantive law of arbitrability that has grown up
around the FAA in the last quarter-century—and which preempts contrary
state law.34 The majority explains that "[w]hile the interpretation of an
arbitration agreement is generally a matter of state law, . . . the FAA
imposes certain rules of fundamental importance, including the basic
precept that arbitration "is a matter of consent, not coercion."35 The
contractual foundation of arbitration facilitates party choices—including
"who will resolve specific disputes," and "with whom they choose to

32

See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1770, 1772; Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S.
444, 451-53 (2003).
33
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776.
34
See supra notes 9-22.
35
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1773 (quoting Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).

THE STRUGGLE TO SHAPE AMERICAN ARBITRATION

135

arbitrate."36 Here, where the parties' agreement was silent as to the issue of
class-action arbitration—and, indeed, had stipulated that there was "no
agreement" on the matter—there could be no basis upon which to authorize
class arbitration. Explained the Court:
[T]he differences between bilateral and class-action
arbitration are too great for arbitrators to presume,
consistent with their limited powers under the FAA,
that the parties' mere silence on the issue of class-action
arbitration constitutes consent to resolve their disputes
in class proceedings. 37
Such a result could not be inferred "solely from the fact of the parties'
agreement to arbitrate" because class-action arbitration "changes the nature
of arbitration" in various ways: (1) the arbitrator is charged with resolving
not just a single dispute, "but instead resolves many disputes between
hundreds or . . . thousands of parties"; (2) the "presumption of privacy and
confidentiality" is lost; (3) the arbitrator's award "adjudicates the rights of
absent parties"; and (4) the commercial stakes are particularly significant, as
in class-action litigation.38
Thus, the majority concludes that, as a matter of federal law, there
can be no class-action arbitration when the parties have stipulated there is
"no agreement" on the matter.39 The present decision arguably fits more
squarely than Bazzle within the general body of American precedents
36

Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1774.
Id. at 1776.
38
Id. at 1775-76.
39
See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776.
37
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involving multi-party conflict and multiple arbitration agreements.40 The
majority of U.S. courts that considered the question have taken it upon
themselves to address issues relating to the consolidated arbitration of
multi-party disputes involving multiple contracts and multiple arbitration
agreements, and have characterized the key issue as one of consent.41
C.

Stolt-Nielsen as Reflective of International Forum Selection Policies
Although the Court did not address the issue, its decision in Stolt-

Nielsen is in line with the body of precedents reflecting strong receptiveness
to arbitration provisions as a species of forum selection clauses in

40

See IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, III FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS & REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT, ch. 33 (Little, Brown & Co. ed., Aspen Law & Bus. 1999) (1994)
(discussing federal case law, most of which holds that, absent express agreement, an
arbitrator does not have authority to expand an action into a class action).
41
See Gov't of U.K. of Gr. Brit. & N. Ir. v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 1993)
(quoting Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1991))
(“‘[A] court is not permitted to interfere with private arbitration arrangements in order to
impose its own view of speed and economy. . . . If contracting parties wish to have all
disputes that arise from the same factual situation arbitrated in a single proceeding, they
can simply provide for consolidated arbitration in the arbitration clauses to which they are a
party.”); Pac. Reins. Mgmt. Corp. v. Ohio Reins. Corp., 935 F.2d 1019, 1026-27 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that arbitrator does not have authority add new parties to arbitration
proceedings without the consent of all parties); Hotel Restaurant Employees Int’l Union v.
Michelson’s Food Svcs., 545 F.2d 1248, 1253 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that arbitrators do
not have the authority to expand an action into a class action). See generally MACNEIL,
SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 40, ch. 33. The Stolt-Nielsen majority's decision
clearly seeks to undermine Bazzle—which, the majority concludes, failed to yield a
majority decision on any of the questions presented. Bazzle was hardly a model of clarity
or comfort for anyone; counsel for financial services companies as well as consumer
counsel have roundly criticized the result. See Brief for Petitioner at 21-23, AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, No. 09-893 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2010) (noting risks of class-wide
arbitration, given the potentially broad consequences of a class-wide arbitration award and
limited judicial review of awards). One wonders whether Alito and company regard the
post-Bazzle establishment of procedures to facilitate class action arbitration as a great deal
of sound and fury ultimately signifying nothing.
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international contracts.42 Richard Nagareda argues that the Court’s
downplaying

of

state

policies

supporting

class

action

and

its

characterization of the “fundamental changes” that class-wide arbitration
would bring is consistent with prevailing international practice. U.S.-style
class actions are “anomalous” among global regimes; the concept of an optout class proceeding is distinctly at odds with civil law precepts that require
affirmative consent to disposition of claimant’s rights.43 The Stolt-Nielsen
holding thus avoids potential issues of other nations’ public policy
applicable to the recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards under
the New York Convention,44 and “effectively eases what otherwise would
be the potential for tension between the obligation of other nations to
recognize and enforce arbitral awards under the New York Convention and
the principles that those same nations would use to recognize and enforce
judgments in litigation.”45
D.

Implications for Adhesion and “Class Action Waiver” Scenarios
There is, however, a very different way of looking at Stolt-Nielsen,

and that involves its potential implications for judicial treatment of socalled “waiver of class action” clauses featured in predispute arbitration

42

See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). See generally, Nagareda, supra
note 6.
43
Nagareda, supra note 6, at 29.
44
Id. at 30; see also Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, [New York Convention], available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/1958NYConvention.pdf
45
Nagareda, supra note 6, at 30. For a contrary view, see S.I. Strong, The Sounds of
Silence: Are U.S. Arbitrators Creating Internationally Enforceable Awards When Ordering
Class Arbitration in Cases of Contractual Silence or Ambiguity, 30 MICH. J. INT’L. L.
1017, 1083-91 (2009).
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agreements in many consumer and employment contracts.46 Among the
“grounds… at law or in equity” recognized by the Court is the doctrine of
unconscionability.47 The defense of unconscionability has been the
centerpiece of widespread efforts to avoid arbitration in recent years,
usually in the context of standardized agreements for employment or
consumer goods or services that exhibit certain characteristics of contracts
of adhesion.48 Where a party is found to lack “a meaningful opportunity” to
bargain, resulting in “unfairly one-sided” terms,49 a federal or state court
may employ state principles of unconscionability to deny enforcement to all
46

See generally, Alexander J. Casey, Arbitration Nation: Wireless Service Providers and
Class Arbitration Waivers, 6 WASHINGTON J. LAW, TECH. & ARTS 15 (2010); Yongdam
Li, Applying the Doctrine of Unconscionability to Employment Arbitration Agreements,
With Emphasis on Class Arbitration/ Arbitration Waivers, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 665
(2010); Shelley McGill, Consumer Arbitration Clause Enforcement: A Balanced
Legislative Response, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 361 (2010); William H. Baker, Class Action
Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 335 (2009); Richard M. Alderman, Why
We Really Need the Arbitration Fairness Act: It’s All About Separation of Powers, 12 J.
OF CONSUMER & COM. L. 151, 154 (2009) (discussing the recent “attack” on consumer
arbitration by consumer advocates and the “widely criticized” “additional problem... that an
arbitration clause may preclude the use of the class actions device”); Heather Bromfield,
The Denial of Relief: The Enforcement of Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements,
43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 315 (2009); Diana Link & Richard Bales, Waiving Rights
Goodbye: Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements After Stolt-Nielsen v.
AnimalFeeds International, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1685297.
47
Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996) (“Generally applicable
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate
arbitration agreements without contravening [FAA] § 2.”); see also supra text
accompanying notes 15, 22; infra text accompanying notes 121-47.
48
The leading commentary on adhesion contracts remains Rakoff, supra note 23. Professor
Rakoff enumerates several identifying elements of contracts of adhesion, to wit: (1) “…a
printed form that contains many terms and clearly purports to be a contract”; (2) a form
drafted by one party to the transaction; (3) “[t]he drafting party participates in numerous
transactions of the type represented…”; (4) the form is presented with the representation
that “the drafting party will enter into the transaction only on the terms contained in the
document”; (5) after dickering over whatever terms are open to bargaining, the adhering
party signs the document; (6) “[t]he adhering party enters into few transactions of the type
represented by the form”; (7) the principle obligation of the adhering party is to pay money.
Id. at 1176-80.
49
See discussion infra text accompanying notes 121-24.
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or part of an arbitration agreement, or reform the provision.50 Among the
substantive grounds supporting unconscionability defenses, contractual
waivers of the right to participate in a class action are among the most
common;51 they have also produced conflicting rulings by courts.52 Again,
much—including both the unconscionability determination and the relief
granted—hinges on the applicable state law.53
The Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen, while not a direct assault on
the breastworks of unconscionability and class action waiver doctrine,
nonetheless laid the siege lines. Though Justice Alito’s opinion stops short
of "decid[ing] what contractual basis may support a finding that the parties
agreed to authorize class-action arbitration," it may perceived by some as a
clear signal of the Court's lack of receptiveness to concerns about the
impact of arbitration provisions on plaintiffs' ability to bring class actions—
especially since the question may be decided not on the basis of state law
50

See, e.g., Lowden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F.3d 1213, 1219-21 (9th Cir. 2008)
(applying Washington state law); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893-95
(9th Cir. 2002) (applying New York state law); Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc.,
655 S.E.2d 362, 369-70, 372-73 (N.C. 2008); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare
Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 680-90 (Cal. 2000). See also infra text accompanying notes 126-34.
51
See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments,
57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 630-36 (2010).
52
David Horton, supra note 51, at 634. See, e.g., Homa v. Am. Express Co., 558 F.3d 225,
229-32 (3d Cir. 2009) (class action waiver in credit card agreement unconscionable); Chalk
v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 560 F.3d 1087, 1096-98 (9th Cir. 2009) (class action waiver made
entire arbitration clause unconscionable since waiver provision was "not severable");
Laster v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 854-56, 857-59 (9th Cir. 2009) (class action
waiver made arbitration clause unconscionable; FAA did not expressly or impliedly
preempt California law governing unconscionability); Kaneff v. Del. Title Loans, Inc. 587
F.3d 616, 624-25 (3d Cir. 2009) (arbitration clause in car loan agreement requiring debtor
to arbitrate all disputes but allowing lender to repossess through court channels or self-help,
containing class action waiver, provision for sharing of costs, and filing fee was not
unconscionable under state law); Cicle v. Chase Bank USA, 583 F.3d 549, 555-56 (8th Cir.
2009) (arbitration clause in credit card agreement containing waiver of class action not
unconscionable under Missouri law).
53
See, e.g., Lowden, 512 F.3d at 1219-21 (applying Washington state law); Circuity City
Stores, 279 F.3d at 893-95 (applying New York State law); Tillman, 655 S.E.2d at 369-70,
372-73; Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 680-90; See also, infra text accompanying notes 126-34.
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and policy, but on that penumbra of federal law substantive law which the
Court has found emanating from the FAA. While, as noted above, the Court
has repeatedly taken the position that federal law is so supportive of
agreements to arbitrate all kinds of civil disputes that it displaces state law
that stands in the way of maximal enforcement;54 Stolt-Nielsen appears to
go further. Alito’s opinion presages a “second tier” of substantive
arbitrability law under the FAA—a body of law that not only affirmatively
enforces agreements to arbitrate, but sets federal boundaries regarding the
nature and scope of consent to arbitrate. Although it is too soon to tell, the
Alito decision may be taken by some as a hint that the Court is prepared to
remove the state law- and policy-based underpinnings for decisions
directing parties to “class action arbitration” in the absence of specific
contract language providing for such procedures (language which is highly
unlikely to appear in any agreement55) and perhaps even to preempt state
precedents deeming contractual provisions purporting to waive class-based
relief in arbitration unconscionable.56
The latter concerns, of course, are sharply focused on the context of
standardized contracts of adhesion, while the present case involved armslength bargaining between sophisticated parties.57 Alito alludes to this in a
footnote criticizing the arbitration panel for relying on "cited arbitration
awards,” “none of [which] involved a contract between sophisticated
business entities."58 Justice Ginsberg took note of this qualification,
54

See supra text accompanying notes 9-22.
Nagareda, supra note 6, (“[F]aced with the choice of a class action in court and class
arbitration, [corporate] defendants’ oft-noted move is to opt for the devil you know...”).
56
See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 130 S.Ct. 3322 (argued May 24, 2010) (No. 09-893)
(granting cert. to at last address the issue of class action waivers).
57
See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1764-65 (2010).
58
Id. at 1768 n.4.
55
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concluding that the Court “apparently spares” contracts of adhesion from a
requirement that consent to class arbitration be expressed affirmatively.59
Ginsberg and the dissenting justices, moreover, sought to read the Court’s
holding as requiring “a contractual basis for concluding that the parties
agreed” to submit disputes to class arbitration, but not necessarily express
assent.”60
There is therefore room for surmise about how the Court would
handle the class-action issue in an adhesion contract setting. Might a
moderate judge enable a majority of the Court to reason that the
"consensual dictates" of the FAA give way in any respect to the moderating
realities of mass contracting, where additional concerns regarding the
realities of assent come into play?61 The Court will have the opportunity to
address the issue in the AT&T v. Concepcion62— a decision which with
Stolt-Nielsen and Rent-A-Center may comprise a Third Arbitration Trilogy.
Meanwhile, in light of Stolt-Nielsen, the Supreme Court summarily
vacated and remanded for reconsideration the decision of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors

59

Id. at 1783 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
61
See Richard M. Alderman, Why We Really Need the Arbitration Fairness Act: It’s All
About Separation of Powers, 12 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 151, 154 (2009) (quoting a
recent dissenting opinion in a Florida arbitration decision: “What we have begun to see is
that virtually all consumer transactions, no matter the size or type, now contain an
arbitration clause. And with every reinforcing decision, these clauses become ever more
brazenly loaded to the detriment of the consumer. . . . Most consumers can’t read them,
won’t read them, don’t understand them, don’t understand their implication and can’t
afford counsel to help them out”); William H. Baker, Class Action Arbitration, 10
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 335, 352 (2009) (reviewing recent cases addressing class
action arbitration and noting the “special considerations” facing consumer contracts “where
the consumers had no real opportunity to negotiate or change the clauses”).
62
See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 130 S.Ct. 3322 (argued May 24, 2010) (No. 09-893).
60
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Restaurant.63 As in Stolt-Nielsen, the dispute in American Express involves
commercial parties. A putative class of merchants who accept American
Express's payment card allege that American Express has breached antitrust
law in its dealings with the class. However, many of the merchants are
small businesses with individual claims not exceeding $5,000. Unlike the
arbitration clause in Stolt-Nielsen, the clause in question in American
Express did not specifically allocate arbitrability decisions to the arbitrator.
The Second Circuit—with then-Judge Sotomayor on the panel—
ruled that the question of enforceability of class action waiver provisions in
arbitration was for the court, rather than the arbitrator, and that enforcing
the waiver provision would equate to granting American Express de facto
immunity from federal antitrust liability by precluding the plaintiffs' only
reasonable means of recovery given their disparate bargaining power.64
Because the contract in question in American Express bears some of the
earmarks of a contract of adhesion,65 the Second Circuit may become the
first U.S. appellate court to apply Stolt-Nielsen to a contract of adhesion
between businesses. It is likely, however, to have more specific guidance
from the Court in the form of a decision in A.T.& T. v. Concepcion.66

63

Italian Colors Rest. v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 554 F.3d 300, (2d Cir.
2009), vacated and remanded sub nom American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., No.
08-1473, 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010).
64
Italian Colors Rest., 554 F.3d at 310-11, 319-20.
65
See Rakoff, supra note 23 at 1176-78.
66
Laster, 584 F.3d 849 (cert. granted sub nom AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
(argued May 24, 2010) (No. 09-893)).
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Stolt-Nielsen, Judicial Vacatur of Awards, and Manifest Disregard
Because of the Court’s consistent penchant for enforcing arbitration

agreements, increasing attention has been paid to the degree of scrutiny
given by courts to arbitration awards in the course of ruling on motions to
vacate. In this regard, one final element of Stolt-Nielsen bears comment—
the rare spectacle of the nation's High Court directing vacatur of a
commercial arbitration award.67 Although, as in Hall Street,68 the Court
declined to give clear direction on the status of the doctrine of "manifest
disregard of the law," the majority nevertheless decided that if such a
standard indeed exists, it was met!69 The arbitration panel failed to consider
what body of law governed the issue of class arbitration, but instead rested
its decision on general public policies supporting the concept. Such an
approach ignored the FAA’s preemptive "consensual foundation"—the
requirement that no person can be required to arbitrate except as prescribed
by agreement. The arbitrators’ failure to recognize and adhere to these basic
principles was an act "in excess of their powers," amounting to "manifest
disregard" of fundamental FAA precepts. (Justice Ginsberg's dissent, joined
by Justices Stevens and Breyer, questioned not only the level of scrutiny

67

See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968) (reinforcing
the perceived breadth of "evident partiality" And giving rise to one of the more popular
bases for motions to vacate awards and, thereby, an extensive progeny of case decisions on
conflict of interest and disclosure): see also IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL &
THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, III FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS &
REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, §40.1.4 (Aspen Law & Business
1994).
68
Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
69
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1768 n.3 (2010).
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applied by the majority but, moreover, the ripeness of the matter for judicial
action).70
Clearly, we have not seen the last of manifest disregard, which the
Second Circuit believes lingers as “judicial gloss” on the FAA’s stipulated
vacatur grounds.71 This is because the Supreme Court failed in Hall Street
to clearly delineate what role, if any, “manifest disregard of the law”
continues to play under the specific terms of the FAA, most notably Section
10(a)(4). The Court briefly noted that “some courts have thought…
‘manifest disregard’ may have been shorthand for Section 10(a)(3) or
Section 10(a)(4)”72—but stopped short of providing guidance on the
appropriateness of such thinking or how either section might underpin
judicial scrutiny of the legal basis of an award. Some courts interpreted Hall
Street as eliminating the principle in cases under the FAA73 while the
Second Circuit and others have continued to apply the principle with or
without reference to Hall Street.74 Now, Stolt-Nielsen suggests, “manifest
70

See id. at 1777 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
72
Hall Street Assoc., 552 U.S. at 585 (citing Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade
Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir. 2003)).
73
See, e.g., Ramos-Santiago v. UPS, 524 F.3d 120, 124 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008) (acknowledging
in dicta that “manifest disregard of the law is not a valid ground for vacating or modifying
an arbitral award in cases brought under the [FAA]”); Robert Lewis Rosen Assocs. v.
Webb, 566 F.Supp.2d 228, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding manifest disregard doctrine no
longer good law and vacatur was limited to grounds stated in the FAA); Supreme Oil Co. v.
Abondolo, 568 F.Supp.2d 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding manifest disregard of law is
not ground for vacatur under the FAA after Hall Street Associates).
74
See, e.g., Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 607 F.3d 634, 641 n.5
(9th Cir. 2010) (arbitrators do not exceed their powers” when they merely misinterpret or
incorrectly apply the governing law; the award must be “completely irrational” or show a
“manifest disregard of the law”); UMass Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. United Food &
Commercial Workers’ Union, 527 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2008) (courts still retain “inherent
powers outside” the FAA to vacate arbitral awards, including situations in which the
arbitrator acts in disregard of law). In a number of recent cases courts have considered
challenges based on manifest disregard without reference to Hall Street Associates, 552
U.S. 576 (2008). See, e.g., Radetsky v. Ferris Baker Watts, Inc., No. 06-CV-1284 (Sept. 3,
71
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disregard,” whatever it is, may still exist! The grey areas are particularly
intriguing with respect to Section 10(a)(4), which supports judicial vacatur
of an award “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.” Although Hall
Street came down strongly against extra-statutory contractual bases for
vacatur, might what the Second Circuit terms “judicial gloss” permit parties
to give form and content to the boundaries of arbitrators’ authority and what
constitutes “exceeding their powers” under Section 10(a)(4)? Might, for
example, parties trigger judicial review of errors of law by describing a
failure to faithfully observe and apply particular law as “in excess of the
arbitrator’s powers”?75 While it is highly doubtful that the Stolt-Nielsen
majority actively contemplated, or relishes, the prospect, there is no doubt
that hopeful attorneys will seize on the wisp of a possibility of wedging a
foot in the door of vacatur. Although, as in the past, very few awards will

2008) (considering challenges to arbitration awards on grounds of manifest disregard
without reference to Hall Street); Grigsby & Assocs. v. M Secs. Inv., Inc., 2008 WL
2959730, 2-4 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2008) (without discussing Hall Street Associates,
confirming an arbitration award after concluding it did not manifestly disregard the law and
was “not arbitrary and capricious”); Hicks v. Cadle Co., 355 Fed.Appx. 186, 196-97 (D.
Col. 2008) (without discussing Hall Street Associates, partially vacating an award on the
basis of manifest disregard); Remote Solution Co. v. FGH Liquidating Corp., 568
F.Supp.2d 534, 543-45 (D. Del. 2008) (without discussing Hall Street Associates, the court
confirmed an award, finding no manifest disregard of law in award of attorney fees
pursuant to a contractual provision).
75
The Court in Hall Street Associates did not specifically address this possibility, which
would by definition involve judicial activity under the existing terms of the FAA and not
supplementary terms such as those the Court explicitly proscribed. On the other hand, such
an approach seems contrary to Hall Street Associates’ declaration of “a national policy
[under the FAA] favoring . . . just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s
essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.” Hall Street Assocs., 552 U.S. at 577,
588; see Thomas J. Stipanowich, Expanded Review of Awards: Hall Street and Cable
Connection, in 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECTION OF PUBLIC UTILITY,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION LAW (2010) (describing current possibilities for
expanded judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards, and other alternatives).
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actually be overturned on grounds of “manifest disregard,”76 the Court’s
failure to effectively put the matter to bed will continue to reduce certainty
and generate additional transaction costs respecting arbitration awards. 77
IV.

RENT-A-CENTER, WEST, INC.
GATEKEEPER

V.

JACKSON: REPLACING

THE

Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson78 involves the critical nexus of
three important bodies of doctrine in the law of arbitration. One involves the
principle, first enunciated by the Court in 1967, that executory arbitration
agreements are separable from the contracts of which they are a part for the
purposes of enforcement—thereby permitting arbitrators to address
defenses to the validity or enforceability of the larger contract.79 A second
stream of caselaw surrounds the enforceability of contractual agreements to
give arbitrators authority to address issues associated with the scope of
arbitrable issues or the existence, validity or enforceability of the arbitration
agreement itself.80 The third body of doctrine is the substantive state law of
unconscionability, which has come into play in numerous federal and state
court decisions as the primary judicially-declared limit on the enforceability

76

Lawrence R. Mills et al., Vacating Arbitration Awards, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer
2005, at 24, 25 fig.5 (summarizing data indicating only about four percent of motions to
vacate based on “manifest disregard” result in vacatur).
77
The majority also borrowed, for the first time in a commercial arbitration decision by the
Court, and somewhat anachronistically, the maxim from the collective bargaining realm
that "[i]t is only when [an] arbitrator strays from interpretation and application of the
agreement and effectively 'dispense[s] his own brand of industrial justice' that his decision
may be unenforceable." Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767
(2010). This principle of labor arbitration must now be regarded as a part of the law
surrounding FAA Section 10(a)(4). 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(4) (2009).
78
Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
79
See infra text accompanying notes 82-99.
80
See infra text accompanying notes 100-20.
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of agreements to arbitrate, habitually in the realm of adhesion contracts.81
The Court’s disposition of those elements in Rent-A-Center will
undoubtedly have huge practical ramifications for those bound by
arbitration agreements of all kinds.
A.

Background of the Case: Three Bodies of Doctrine
1.

Prima Paint and Separability

Section 2 of the FAA states that written contracts to arbitrate are: . . . valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable . . . except on ‘‘such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.’’82 This section expressly makes
predispute arbitration agreements (like agreements to submit existing disputes)
enforceable and puts arbitration contracts on equal footing with other types of
contracts,83 but also makes clear that parties can raise standard contractual defenses
to challenge the validity of an arbitration agreement.84 Consideration of such
defenses is a “gateway” issue that courts are called upon to address, along with
questions about the presence of appropriate written language of agreement and
“scope issues” (that is, whether a controversy that falls within the scope of that
81

See infra text accompanying notes 121-61.
The Section states in full:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof,
or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.
9 U.S.C. §2 (1947).
83
See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 474 (1989).
84
See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 US 681, 687 (1996).
82
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agreement).85 The FAA implements this basic “substantive rule” of enforcement by
permitting parties to apply to a federal court for a stay of the trial of arbitrable
issues under Section 3 or a motion to compel arbitration under Section 4.

The precise boundaries of courts’ “gateway” role in considering
contractual defenses to arbitration agreements, and the respective purviews
of courts and arbitrators under the FAA, were at issue in Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.86 Prima Paint purchased Flood &
Conklin’s (‘‘F&C’’) paint business and entered into a consulting agreement
with the chairman of F&C. Soon Prima Paint stopped making payments
under the agreements, charging that F&C had breached both agreements by
fraudulently representing that it was solvent when it intended to file for
bankruptcy. F&C served a notice of intent to arbitrate. Prima Paint
subsequently filed a lawsuit in the federal court in New York seeking to
rescind the consulting agreement as fraudulently induced. Prima Paint
argued that since the arbitration agreement must rise or fall with the rest of
the contract, its fraud defense must be addressed by a court of law.87 The
Supreme Court, however, reached a contrary conclusion and upheld the
dismissal of Prima Paint’s appeal from a grant of F&C’s motion to compel
arbitration. The Court ruled that the broad terms of the parties’ agreement to
arbitrate, the arbitrators and not a court of law should resolve the question
of fraudulent inducement. The Court’s decision—founded on the principle
that the arbitration clause should be considered separately from the
underlying contract for the purpose of enforcement—has become one of the
cornerstones of modern arbitration law. Although this approach could result

85

See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002); Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-404, 414 (1967).
86
Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. 395, 403-404, 414.
87
Id. at 398.
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in the seeming paradox of arbitrators ruling that the contract that gave rise
to their own jurisdiction was the fruit of fraud, and therefore invalid, the
doctrine of separability (or severability) was—and continues to be—
justified on the ground that the vitality of arbitration clauses will be
undermined by allowing parties to waylay the process through front-end
challenges to the whole contract.88 Only where the challenge is aimed
directly at the arbitration provision itself is there a place for judicial
intervention at the “gateway”; otherwise, the issue of the contract’s validity
is for the arbitrator in the first instance.
In addition to becoming part of arbitration doctrine under the FAA, this
rationale has proven persuasive in the arena of international arbitration, where the
principle of separability is broadly established.89 It is also widely embraced under
the arbitration law of various U.S. states,90 and was expressly recognized in the
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act.91
88

The Court found this conclusion “explicit” under § 4 of the FAA, under which federal
courts are directed to compel arbitration upon proof that “the making of the agreement for
arbitration or the failure to comply [with the arbitration agreement] is not in issue”—a
provision that reinforced the limited nature of front-end judicial “gatekeeping” and
promoted the parties’ presumed desire for early resort to arbitration…
[I]f the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause
itself—an issue which goes to the ‘‘making’’ of the agreement to
arbitrate—the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it. But the
statutory language does not permit the federal court to consider
claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally. . . . We
hold, therefore . . . that a federal court may consider only issues
relating to the making and performance of the agreement to
arbitrate. In so concluding, we not only honor the plain meaning
of the statute but also the unmistakably clear congressional
purpose that the arbitration procedure, when selected by the parties
to a contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction in
the courts.
Id. at 403-04.
89
See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL Model Law On
International Commercial Arbitration, at 8, art. 16(1) (2008), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf.
90
See, e.g., Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 644 So. 2d 1258 (Ala. 1994); U.S. Insulation,
Inc. v. Hilro Constr. Co., 705 P.2d 490 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Erickson, Arbuthnot,
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The continuing vitality—and potential reach—of the separability principle

under the FAA was made evident in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,92 a
decision involving a broad-form arbitration provision in a standardized consumer lending contract. The case was brought as a putative class action in Florida state
court against Buckeye, a check-cashing service; the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant had charged usurious interest rates and that its standard deferredpayment agreement violated various Florida lending and consumer-protection
laws, rendering it criminal on its face. Buckeye filed a motion to compel
arbitration under the broad arbitration provision in it contract. The trial court
denied the motion, holding that a court rather than an arbitrator should resolve a
claim that a contract is illegal and void ab initio. This decision was reversed by an
appellate court but reinstated by the Florida Supreme Court, which concluded that
“to enforce an agreement to arbitrate in a contract challenged as unlawful ‘‘‘could
breathe life into a contract that not only violates state law, but also is criminal in
nature. ...”93 The Court granted certiorari and, in a 7-1 decision (with one
abstention), reversed the Florida Court. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia
reasoned that the severability principle of Prima Paint was now applicable in state
as well as federal court actions subject to the FAA under the Court’s holding in
Southland Corp. v. Keating,94 which recognized FAA Section 2 as a source of
federal substantive arbitration law which was ‘‘applicable in state and federal

McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street, 673 P.2d 251 (Cal. 1983); Hercules
& Co. v. Shama Rest. Corp., 613 A.2d 916 (D.C. 1992); Brown v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co.,
921 P.2d 146 (Haw. 1996); Quirk v. Data Terminal Sys., Inc., 400 N.E.2d 858 (Mass.
1980); Weinrott v. Carp, 298 N.E.2d 42 (N.Y. 1973); Weiss v. Voice/Fax Corp., 640
N.E.2d 875 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); Jackson Mills, Inc. v. BT Capital Corp., 440 S.E.2d 877
(S.C. 1994); South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth. v. Great W. Coal, 437 S.E.2d 22 (S.C. 1993);
Gerwell v. Moran, 10 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. App. 1999); Schneider, Inc. v. Research-Cottrell,
Inc., 474 F. Supp 1179 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (applying Pennsylvania law); New Process Steel
Corp. v. Titan Indus. Corp., 555 F. Supp. 1018 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (applying Texas law);
Pinkis v. Network Cinema Corp., 512 P.2d 751 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973).
91
See REVISED UNIF. ARB. ACT § 6(c) & cmt.4 U.L.A. 18 (amended 2000).
92
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
93
Id. at 440.
94
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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courts.’’95 Because the challenge to the present agreement did not target the
arbitration provisions, there was no room for judicial intervention at the “gateway”
under the FAA, and the issues he challenged should therefore be initially
considered by an arbitrator, not a court. It was irrelevant, concluded Scalia, that
Florida public policy and contract law might refuse to sever or salvage “parts of a
contract found illegal and void under Florida law;’’ in Southland, the Court ruled
that state law “could [not] bar enforcement of Section 2, even in the context of
state-law claims brought in state court.”96 Moreover, Prima Paint failed to
distinguish between defenses making contracts voidable and those rendering
contracts illegal or void—all defenses were for the arbitrator in the first instance
unless directed specifically at the agreement to arbitrate.97
Although the separability doctrine has attained broad acceptance
domestically and internationally in the arena of commercial contracts, Buckeye’s
projection of the Prima Paint into the realm of non-negotiated mass consumer
credit contracts and illegality on the face of an agreement raised concerns that the
separability principle vouchsafed to arbitrators too much authority to police illegal
behavior and provided companies with a mechanism for effectively avoiding the
courthouse.98 While judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision is theoretically
available at the post-award stage, as a practical matter its potency is significantly
diminished as a result of the timing and, even more, by the narrow bases for
vacatur of award under the FAA.99

95

Id. at 12.
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 546 U.S. at 445.
97
Id.
98
See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107 (2007) (advocating repeal of the separability
doctrine).
99
See Cross, supra note 6; 1 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
955-958 (Kluwer Law Int’l, 2009).
96
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2.

Contractual Allocation of “Gateway” Decisions

Although the separability doctrine significantly diminished the
“gateway” role of courts under the FAA, courts still serve as “gatekeepers”
to make determinations relating to the arbitration agreement itself. The
kinds of questions they may be called upon to address are (1) questions
regarding the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement, as where a
party claims to have been deceived as to the true nature or content of an
arbitration agreement or raises other contractual defenses to its
enforcement;100 and (2) questions about whether or not a particular dispute
falls within the scope of an arbitration provision.101 As it happens, however,
both categories of questions have themselves been deemed to be arbitrable
in certain circumstances under U.S. and other law.102
In fact, agreements to delegate “gateway” functions to arbitrators are
ubiquitous in business contracts. Concerns about delays and inefficiencies
caused by front-end resort to court prompted drafters to give arbitrators
authority to resolve not only disputes relating to the contract of which the
arbitration provision is a part, but also (1) defenses aimed at the existence,
validity or enforceability of the arbitration provision itself, or (2) issues
respecting the scope of its application. Clauses addressing “KompetenzKompetenz” (the authority of arbitrators to address their own competence to
hear certain controversies under an arbitration agreement) are a standard

100

See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (June 21, 2010); First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
101
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 872 F.2d 534, 537 (2d Cir. 1989);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985).
102
See generally BORN, supra note 99, 851-1001 (discussing the doctrine of “competencecompetence” (“Kompetenz-Kompetenz”) under international law and the laws of the U.S.
and other countries).
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feature of international commercial arbitration rules.103 Virtually all of the
leading procedures for commercial—that is, business-to-business—
arbitration in the United States include language that purports to give
arbitrators plenary authority over all issues, including those surrounding the
enforceability of the arbitration agreement and other arbitrability issues.104
Of course, “[t]here is . . . almost inescapable circularity” to
provisions that grant arbitrators authority to address questions about the
existence or validity of the very arbitration agreement from which they
derive their power.105 As Gary Born explains, “[i]n these circumstances”
any authority devolving upon an arbitration tribunal must spring from
national or international law.106 Internationally, such authority may be
found under the European Convention, the UNCITRAL Model Law, and,
impliedly, under the New York Convention.107
Although the FAA contains no express provisions addressing the
possibility of allocating “gateway” functions to arbitrators, Supreme Court
decisions have addressed the issue. One critical precedent is AT&T
Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America,108 a case
involving a dispute over interpretation of the breadth of application of an

103

See id. at 869-870.
For example, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) Commercial Arbitration
Rules state, “The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction,
including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration
agreement.” AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, Commercial Arbitration Rules and
Mediation
Procedures,
R-7(a)
(June
1,
2009),
available
at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440.
105
BORN, supra note 99, at 870.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
104
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arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement under the TaftHartley Act,109 the Court explained:
[W]hether a[n] … agreement creates a duty for the
parties to arbitrate the particular grievance ... is
undeniably an issue for judicial determination. …
Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide
otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the
arbitrator.110
In First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan,111 a unanimous Court embraced this
dictum from the labor arbitration arena as the foundation for a standard for
judicial enforcement of agreements to submit what it characterized as
“arbitrability” issues to arbitration under the FAA. Unlike AT&T
Technologies, which involved who should decide a question of the breadth
of a concededly valid agreement to arbitrate, First Options was concerned
with who should decide whether the defendant investors had actually
assented to an arbitration agreement with a stock trade-clearing firm. In
order for the question to be directed to the arbitrator, reasoned Justice
Breyer’s opinion, there would need to be a finding of the parties’ objective
intent to arbitrate arbitrability.112 However, because an agreement of this

109

29 U.S.C. §185(a) (2006).
AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649. The Court went on to conclude, however, that courts
should construe arbitration agreements broadly, and “resolve doubts in favor of coverage.”
Id. at 656 (citing Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83
(1960)).
111
First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
112
Id. at 944-45.
110

THE STRUGGLE TO SHAPE AMERICAN ARBITRATION

155

kind would empower arbitrators to address issues that parties might
reasonably expect a judge to decide,113 it was appropriate to require an
enhanced burden of proof in the form of “clear and unmistakable” evidence
that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.114
The Court proceeded to find no such evidence in the case before it.
Had the decision been otherwise, however, the arbitrator’s decision would
have been accorded significant deference. Justice Breyer made clear that
once a judgment is made that parties have committed questions of
arbitrability to the arbitrator:

113

“Giving the arbitrators that power... might too often force unwilling parties to arbitrate a
matter they reasonably would have thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would decide.” Id. at
945. Breyer continues:
In this manner the law treats silence or ambiguity about the
question ‘‘who (primarily) should decide arbitrability’’ differently
from the way it treats silence or ambiguity about the question
‘‘whether a particular merits-related dispute is arbitrable because it
is within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement’’—for in
respect to this latter question the law reverses the presumption...
Id. at 944.
With respect to the pro-arbitration presumption that applies to a court’s determination of
whether a particular dispute is arbitrable, the Court cites Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (“‘[A]ny doubts concerning the scope
of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration’”) (quoting Moses H. Cone
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)). Breyer explains,
The latter question arises when the parties have a contract that
provides for arbitration of some issues. In such circumstances, the
parties likely gave at least some thought to the scope of arbitration.
And, given the law’s permissive policies in respect to arbitration...
one can understand why the law would insist upon clarity before
concluding that the parties did not want to arbitrate a related
matter. ... On the other hand, the former question—the ‘‘who
(primarily) should decide arbitrability’’ question—is rather arcane.
A party often might not focus upon that question or upon the
significance of having arbitrators decide the scope of their own
powers ...
First Options, 514 U.S. at 945.
114
First Options, 514 U.S. at 944 (quoting AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649).
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[T]he court’s standard for reviewing the arbitrator’s
decision about that matter should not differ from the
standard courts apply when they review any other
matter that the parties have agreed to arbitrate… [T]he
court should give considerable leeway to the arbitrator,
setting aside his or her decision only in certain narrow
circumstances.115
First Options has been the subject of considerable commentary, much of it
critical.116 Particular concerns have been raised about the Court’s use of the
vague term “arbitrability” and its appropriation of dictum from labor
precedents that involved questions of scope under concededly valid
arbitration agreements in support of a decision involving the question of the
very existence of a valid agreement.117 Some courts have continued to insist
that challenges to existence, validity or enforceability must be reserved for
judicial determination,118 since, as explained by the Third Circuit, “a
contract cannot give an arbitral body any power, much less the power to
determine its own jurisdiction [,i]f the parties never entered into it.”119 But a
growing number of courts applied the dictum of First Options to enforce
“clear and unmistakable” provisions empowering arbitrators to address
questions of the existence, validity or enforceability of arbitration
115

Id. at 943 (citing AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649; Warrior, 363 U.S. at 583, n. 7).
See, e.g., Steven H. Reisberg, The Rules Governing who Decides Jurisdictional Issues:
First Options v. Kaplan Revisited, 20 AM. REV. OF INT’L ARB. 159 (2009); Cross, supra
note 6, at 24-35. See generally BORN, supra note 99, at 914 n.327 (citing numerous
articles).
117
See e.g., Reisberg, supra, note 116, at 159-60; Cross, supra note 6, at 27-30.
118
See, e.g., China Minmetals Materials Import & Exp. Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d
274, 287 (3d Cir. 2003); Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587, 591 (7th
Cir. 2001).
119
China Minmetals, 334 F.3d at 288.
116
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agreements, not just issues of scope.120 However desirable this outcome in
the broad run of commercial contracts, it raises significant potential
concerns on the part of advocates for consumers and employees who find
themselves subject to boilerplate arbitration provisions prepared by a
company lawyer. It requires little imagination to appreciate that an
agreement consigning virtually all legal and factual issues to arbitrators,
including challenges aimed at the very source of their authority, is a
singularly effective way of making arbitration a procedural black box,
hermetically sealed from court intrusion.
3.

Unconscionability

Unconscionability is the key doctrine used by courts in addressing
perceived due process concerns growing out of arbitration agreements in
contracts of “adhesion.”121 The doctrine evolved as a means of permitting
courts to police contracts for “gross inequality of bargaining power,
together with terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party.”122
120

See, e.g., Terminix Int’l Co., LP v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 432 F.3d 1327, 1331-2
(11th Cir. 2005); Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co. Ltd., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2d Cir.
2005); and other cases cited at 581 F.3d at 917. See generally Cross, supra note 6, at 34
n.129 (citing authority), 61-67 (discussing cases).
121
See generally, Bruhl, supra note 2 (describing Court-directed expansion of FAA);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of
Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO. ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 757 (2004).
122
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981) states:
d. Weakness in the bargaining process. A bargain is not
unconscionable merely because the parties to it are unequal in
bargaining position, nor even because the inequality results in an
allocation of risks to the weaker party. But gross inequality of
bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably favorable to
the stronger party, may confirm indications that the transaction
involved elements of deception or compulsion, or may show that
the weaker party had no meaningful choice, no real alternative, or
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Proving unconscionability normally requires a showing of circumstances
indicating an “adhesive” bargain (so-called “procedural unconscionability”)
as well as unfair contract terms (“substantive unconscionability”).123 As
formulated in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, unconscionability affords courts
considerable discretion in tailoring appropriate remedies—from invalidating
a contract to narrow blue-penciling.124
Until

fairly

recently,

judicial

decisions

grounded

on

unconscionability doctrine were few and far between.125 With the expanded
use of binding arbitration provisions in consumer and employment
contracts, however, unconscionability doctrine came into vogue as a means
of curtailing perceived abuses of corporate power aimed at denying

did not in fact assent or appear to assent to the unfair terms.
Factors which may contribute to a finding of unconscionability in
the bargaining process include the following: belief by the stronger
party that there is no reasonable probability that the weaker party
will fully perform the contract; knowledge of the stronger party
that the weaker party will be unable to receive substantial benefits
from the contract; knowledge of the stronger party that the weaker
party is unable reasonably to protect his interests by reason of
physical or mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy or inability to
understand the language of the agreement, or similar factors.
123
See generally Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965); 8 Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 18:9
(4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 2010).
124
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (“If a contract or term
thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or
may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable
result”); U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2003) (“If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to
avoid any unconscionable result”).
125
See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration:
Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 609, 610 (2009); Bruhl,
supra note 2, at 1439-1442.
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fundamentally fair procedures to other parties in contracts of adhesion.126
Unconscionability has been a relatively successful mode127 of judicially
challenging the enforceability of arbitration agreements containing
unilateral arbitration clauses,128 limitations of remedies,129 class action
waivers,130 confidential arbitration requirements,131 and fee-splitting and

126

Stempel, supra note 121, at 803-807; Bruhl, supra note 2, at 1440 fig.1. Cross, supra
note 6, at 10 n.28 (Challenges to the enforceability of arbitration agreements based on
unconscionability defences tend to represent sixteen to eighteen percent of all arbitration
cases).
127
It has been estimated that around forty percent of unconscionability defenses to
arbitration agreements have meet with success in recent years. Cross, supra note 6, at 11
n.20.
128
See, e.g., Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding
unconscionable, for lack of mutuality, clause requiring employee to arbitrate claims but
allowing employer to bring judicial action); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv.,
Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689-94 (Cal. 2000) (finding arbitration clause unconscionable where it
required employees but not employer to arbitrate claims and limited employees’ potential
damages but not employer’s); Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362,
372-73 (N.C. 2008) (holding arbitration clause unconscionable because lender had
managed to avoid ever arbitrating a claim against a borrower, while clause required
borrowers to arbitrate claims against lender).
129
See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming, without giving
reasons, lower court’s holding that limitation of remedies was unconscionable); Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding unconscionable
“asymmetry is compounded by the fact that the agreement limits the relief available to
employees”).
130
See, e.g., Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 59-60 (1st Cir. 2007)
(holding class waiver unconscionable because it would “result in oppression and unfair
surprise to the disadvantaged party”); Ting, 319 F.3d at 1150 (holding class waiver
unconscionable because one-sided); Hall v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 608 F. Supp. 2d 592,
603-04 (D.N.J. 2009) (finding arbitration provisions unconscionable because likely
amounts of individual recovery were small and company was effectively immunized “from
claims that would be suitable for class action resolution”); Tillman v. Comm’l Credit
Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 373 (N.C. 2008) (holding that class waiver, together with
other provisions in arbitration agreement, rendered agreement unconscionable; the class
waiver “contribute[d] to the financial inaccessibility of the arbitral forum” and
“contribute[d] to the one-sidedness of the clause because the right to join claims and pursue
class actions would benefit only borrowers”); Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000,
1004 (Wash. 2007) (recognizing that majority of jurisdictions uphold class action waivers
but citing cases from fifteen jurisdictions holding that class action waivers in arbitration
agreements were substantively unconscionable); Vasquez-Lopez v. Beneficial Oregon,
Inc., 152 P.3d 940, 951 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (holding class waiver unconscionable because
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pays”

schemes.132

While

some

courts

have

employed

unconscionability to strike down entire arbitration agreements, others have
taken a “surgical” approach, excising or reforming problematic provisions
and sustaining the arbitration agreement.133 Predictably, the courts of some
states, such as California, have been considerably more energetic in
developing unconscionability doctrine than others.134

it was “unilateral in effect and . . . gives defendant a virtual license to commit, with
impunity, millions of dollars’ worth of small-scale fraud”).
131
See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151-52 (finding provision requiring that
arbitration remain confidential unconscionable because it prevents “accumulat[ion] of a
body of knowledge on a particular company” that could mitigate repeat player effect). Cf.
Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1180-83 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (holding
secrecy clause violates public policy, which “may be distinguished from a finding of
unconscionability,” but hinges on similar concerns about repeat player effect and loss of
information to the public).
132
See, e.g., Ting, 319 F.3d at 1151 (holding requirement that customers split arbitration
fees with corporation unconscionable because “some complainants would . . . face
prohibitive arbitration costs, effectively deterring them from vindicating their statutory
rights”); Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 371-72 (N.C. 2008)
(holding arbitration clause requiring loser to pay costs unconscionable where plaintiffs
“live paycheck to paycheck” and “simply do not have the resources to risk facing these
kinds of fees”); Vasquez-Lopez, 152 P.3d at 951-52 (holding cost-sharing provision
unconscionable because it makes cost of bringing an action prohibitive).
133
Compare Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 695-99 (Cal.
2000) (declining to sever unconscionable clauses from arbitration agreement because
unconscionability “permeated”), Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1293 (9th
Cir. 2006) (striking down entire arbitration agreement because it had “multiple defects
[that] indicate a systematic effort to impose arbitration . . . as an inferior forum”), and
Tillman, 655 S.E.2d at 373-74 (declining to sever unconscionable provisions because “this
particular arbitration clause . . . does not allow for meaningful redress of grievances”) with
Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 63 (1st Cir. 2007) (severing
unconscionable clause and upholding rest of arbitration agreement because both parties
wanted this remedy) and Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding
unconscionable provisions of arbitration agreement invalid but an unconscionable aspect
“revived”).
134
California courts have employed unconscionability to deny enforcement to arbitration
agreements on numerous occasions. In the seminal decision of Armendariz, 6 P.3d 669, the
California Supreme Court used unconscionability doctrine as the basis for considering what
procedural protections would be essential requisites for the arbitration of statutory
discrimination claims under an employment agreement. Such elements included an
independent and impartial arbitrator, an opportunity for the employee to have adequate
discovery, limits on the cost of arbitration, remedies akin to those available in court, a
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Significantly, before this year the U.S. Supreme Court has never
applied, or specifically addressed in a holding, the doctrine of
unconscionability or similar policy grounds in the arbitration context. Aside
from general hortatory dicta, it has avoided pronouncements singling out
arbitration provisions in “adhesion” contracts for special treatment.
The Court has stated repeatedly that “courts should remain attuned
to well-supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the
sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds
‘for

the

revocation

of

any

contract,’’135

and

has

enumerated

unconscionability as among the “generally applicable contract defenses”
that may invalidate an arbitration agreement.136 On the other hand, the
Court has never actually affirmed the denial or limited enforcement of an
arbitration agreement on such grounds. Regardless of the transactional
setting, the votes of a majority of justices have regularly been mustered in
support of the presumption that binding arbitration is an effective surrogate
for public judicial resolution of statute-based claims as well as actions at
common law in the absence of clear and specific evidence to the contrary.137
written decision allowing limited judicial review, and procedural ‘‘bilaterality.’’ Because
not all of these requirements were met, the court struck down the entire agreement as
unconscionable.
135
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985);
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473
U.S. 614).
136
See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (Arbitration
agreements “may be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud,
duress or unconscionability.”); Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515
U.S. 528, 555-56 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A]n arbitration clause may be invalid
without violating the FAA if . . . the provision is unconscionable”).
137
In Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20, the Court upheld a motion to compel arbitration of an
employee’s Age Discrimination of Employment Claims. It reasoned that there was no
proof that arbitration would be any less suitable than litigation in furthering the social
policies underlying the ADEA. Among other things, the Court “decline[d] to indulge the
presumption that the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or
unwilling to retain competent, conscientious and impartial arbitrators.’’ Id. at 30 (quoting
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In the same vein, Court majorities have repeatedly postponed a ruling on a
contested issue where the matter might be deferred to initial consideration
by the arbitrator(s).138 In such cases the practical result is to put off judicial
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 634). There was, continued the Court, no indication that limitations
on discovery would present a problem in the present context any more than in other statutebased actions the Court had found to be arbitrable, such as RICO and antitrust claims.
Moreover, ‘‘even if the arbitration could not go forward as a class action or class relief
could not be granted by the arbitrator, the fact that the [ADEA] provides for the possibility
of bringing a collective action does not mean that individual attempts at conciliation were
intended to be barred... [and] it should be remembered that arbitration agreements will not
preclude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking class-wide and equitable relief.” Id. at 32
(citing Nicholson v. CPC Int’l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 241 (3rd Cir. 1989) (Becker, J.,
dissenting).
Finally, the Court observed that unequal bargaining power between employers and
employees was in itself “not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are
never enforceable in the employment context.” The Court concluded:
Courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the
agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or
overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds ‘for
the revocation of any contract.’’ Id. at 33 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473
U.S. at 627). There is no indication in this case, however, that
Gilmer, an experienced businessman, was coerced or defrauded
into agreeing to the arbitration clause in his registration
application. As with the claimed procedural inadequacies discussed
above, this claim of unequal bargaining power is best left for
resolution in specific cases.
Id.
See also Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) (mere supposition
about overly burdensome arbitration costs is not sufficient reason to invalidate an
arbitration agreement).
138
Consider PacifiCare Health Sys, Inc. v. Book, 123 S. Ct. 1531 (2003), involving an
action by physicians against managed-health-care organizations (HMOs), on the basis,
inter alia, of alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO). The defendant HMOs’ motion to compel arbitration of the RICO claims was
denied by the district court on the ground that the arbitration clauses in the parties'
agreements prohibited awards of “punitive damages,” thereby denying the arbitrator
authority to provide meaningful relief in the form of treble damages under RICO and
rendering the arbitration agreement unenforceable as to those claims. The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed on the basis that it was unclear whether the
arbitration provisions actually prevented arbitrators from awarding treble damages under
RICO, since statutory treble damages provisions may play different roles and, in particular,
RICO's treble-damages provision is remedial in nature. It was therefore not clear whether
the parties intended the term “punitive” to encompass claims for treble damages under
RICO. Because the Court did not know how the arbitrator would construe the limit on
punitive damages, it would be premature for the Court to address them, and the proper
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consideration until after arbitration hearings, at which time the relevant
issues will be addressed within the relatively narrow confines of the
statutory grounds for vacatur of award.139 These and other realities raise
legitimate

concerns

about

the

Court’s

willingness

to

embrace

unconscionability doctrine to any meaningful degree.140
Even while unconscionability doctrine has come to play the primary
role in policing arbitration provisions in contracts of adhesion under the
FAA, given the preemptive effect of that statute on attempts to regulate
arbitration through state legislation, there has lingered the possibility that a
Court majority might be mustered in favor of using preemption to
dramatically narrow the role of unconscionability. A critical note of
warning may be found in dicta in Perry v. Thomas,141 a decision in which

course was to compel arbitration and leave the matter initially to the arbitrator. Cf.
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638 (“Having permitted the arbitration [of antitrust claims] to go
forward, the national courts of the United States will have the opportunity at the awardenforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust
laws has been addressed”).
139
See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (2009), which states:
In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the
district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating
the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration-(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing
to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of
any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.
See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008) (holding that FAA § 10
provides the exclusive grounds for vacatur).
140
See infra text accompanying notes 198-201.
141
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
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the Court held that an arbitration agreement in an employment contract was
enforceable under the FAA. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Marshall,
found that the federal substantive law of arbitrability preempted a section of
the California Labor Code providing that wage collection actions “may be
maintained ‘without regard to the existence of any private agreement to
arbitrate.’”142 Although the Court declined to address the employee’s claim
that the arbitration agreement was “an unconscionable, unenforceable
contract of adhesion,” a matter not considered below, it took pains to
address the “choice-of-law issue that arises when . . . [such] arguments are
asserted.”143 In such cases, explained the Court, FAA Section 2 offers a
“touchstone for choosing between state law principles and the principles of
federal common law envisioned by the [FAA].”144
[Section 2 directs that a]n agreement to arbitrate is
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, as a matter of
federal law, “save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract. Thus, a
state law principle that takes its meaning precisely from
the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not
comport with this requirement of § 2. A court may not,
then, in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an
arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a
manner different from that in which it otherwise
construes nonarbitration agreements under state law.
Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of an
142

CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West 1971).
Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9.
144
Id.
143
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agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state law
holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for
this would enable the court to effect what we hold today
the state legislature cannot.145
Although this language has not since been brought forth by the Court to
quash federal or state court decisions relying on state unconscionability
doctrine to strike down or reform arbitration agreements, it is clearly aimed
at judicial decisions that regulate arbitration agreements qua arbitration
agreements—that is, that focus on elements of arbitration agreements that
are not present in contract provisions generally. Although it is possible to
imagine a scenario in which an arbitration provision is struck down on
unconscionability grounds applicable to contracts generally (as where, to
use an extreme example, a party is physically forced to assent to an
arbitration agreement), nearly all unconscionability defenses implicate
concerns about specific substantive terms of the arbitration agreement:
arbitrator selection, discovery and other administrative procedures, situs of
hearings, costs and fees, remedies, and the like.146 These are all, or mostly,
aspects of arbitration that bear no relationship to contracts generally.147 Put
another way, it is highly unlikely that unconscionability doctrine would be
employed by a federal or state court in any way other than to regulate
arbitration as arbitration.

145

Id. (citations omitted, emphasis supplied).
See supra text accompanying notes 128-132.
147
There may, of course, be certain kinds of substantive elements that appear in an
arbitration agreement that would be unconscionable whether or not an arbitration
agreement is present. One possible example would be a purported waiver of punitive
damages in an employment or consumer contract. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive
Damages and the Consumerization of American Arbitration, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1997).
146
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Binding arbitration agreements in standardized contracts are seldom
the subject of negotiation or of knowledgeable assent148 (indeed, it is
probably fair to assume that the great majority of lawyers still lack all but
the barest understanding of arbitration law and practice),149 and arbitration
agreements can and do fall short of the reasonable expectations of
employees and consumers in a variety of different ways.150 In the 1990s, a
series of initiatives by public and private entities sought to address the most
common concerns and develop minimum standards of due process for
consumer and employment arbitration,151 but private “community”
regulation, or self-regulation, is not alone sufficient to address the
problem.152 Not so long ago, alleged material conflicts of interest in a major
148

See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 108
(1997) (“[I]f all the firms in the market impose the same terms, shopping is impossible. ...
Because form terms are often peripheral to the core of the transaction, the cost of fully
understanding most form terms reasonably appears, at the time of contracting, to outweigh
the benefit. Meaningful understanding of a form term should be recognized as including the
ability to make an informed judgment about its value. With an arbitration clause, this
would include some awareness not only of the procedural distinctions between arbitration
and litigation, but also of any systemic disparity in outcomes generated by the two
procedures. . . . In sum, individual contract adherents are in no position to alter the menu of
form contract terms presented by the market”).
149
See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 WIS. L. Rev.
831, 834 (2001).
150
See id. at 836-37, 888; Schwartz, supra note 148, at 40-53.
151
See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN EMPLOYMENT,
DUE
PROCESS
PROTOCOLS
(1995),
available
at
EMPLOYMENT
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28535; NAT’L CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM.,
CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOLS (1997), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019; COMM’N ON HEALTH CARE DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
DUE
PROCESS
PROTOCOLS
(1998),
available
at
HEALTHCARE
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28633; THE DUNLOP COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF
WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS: FINAL REPORT (1994), available at
http://www.newunionism.net/library/workplace%20democracy/US%20Dunlop%20Commi
ssion%20-%20On%20the%20Future%20of%20Worker-Management%20Relations%20%201995.pdf.
152
See Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 369, 371-72, 417-27 (2004).
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provider of consumer credit arbitration services caused a state attorney
general to take decisive action.153
The Supreme Court’s own decision in Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon154 enforcing arbitration of investor claims under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act was underpinned by the expectation
that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) would employ
“expansive power to ensure the adequacy of the arbitration procedures
employed by [securities self-regulatory organizations] … [and to] “oversee
and regulate the rules.”155 The SEC, with the assistance of its advisory
body, the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA), has
actively supervised ongoing debate and discussion among investor
advocates, the Financial Industry Regulatory Association (FINRA), and
other industry representatives, encouraging the continuing evolution of
procedures that address public as well as private concerns.156 Importantly,

153

The Minnesota Attorney General accused the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), a
Minnesota-based organization that specializes in and focuses on consumer debt actions, of
violating state consumer fraud, deceptive trade practices, and false advertising laws by
hiding financial connections to collection agencies and credit card companies. NAF had
handled more than 214,000 collection claims in 2006, 60 percent of which were filed by
law firms with ties to the collection industry. The NAF denied the allegations. In the
summer of 2009 NAF ceased its consumer arbitration program as part of a settlement.
Under the settlement, the NAF could continue to arbitrate certain types of claims
performed under supervision of government entities or non-government organizations (e.g.,
Internet domain name, cargo, personal injury protection suits, etc.). Firm Agrees to End
Role in Arbitrating Card Debt, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2009, at B8. In August 2009, Bank of
America Corporation said that it would stop requiring that disputes with its credit card
holders and banking and lending customers be settled by binding arbitration. Joshua Freed,
Bank of America drops arbitration requirement, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 13, 2009, available
at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2009657887_apusbankofameric
aarbitration.html?syndication=bondheads.
154
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
155
Id. at 233.
156
See Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities Arbitrators Do Not Grow on Trees, 14
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 49, 54-58 (2008); Constantine N. Katsoris, Roadmap to
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the ongoing oversight and dialogue has proven critical in the development
of a host of pro-consumer modifications in securities arbitration
procedures.157 McMahon reflects the Court’s acknowledgment of the need
for outside regulation of consumer arbitration, but the model remains oneof-a-kind; the Court has not sought to extend it to other arenas of consumer
or employment arbitration.
In the broader realm of consumer and employment arbitration,
especially given the extensive preemption of state legislative regulation by
the FAA, effective judicial oversight is necessary to address various forms
of overreaching. Fraud,158 the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,159
and the doctrine of reasonable expectations160 have all been employed by
state and federal courts in invalidating or reforming arbitration agreements.

Securities ADR, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 413, 420-24 (2006); Stipanowich, supra
note 149, at 900-01.
157
LINDA D. FIENBERG & KENNETH L. ANDRICHIK, NASD DISPUTE RESOLUTION, THE
ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT—A REPORT CARD (2007) available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@guide/documents/industry/p036466
.pdf (reporting developments regarding forum independence, financing and administration;
disclosures to investors; arbitrator selection, quality and training; discovery; mediation;
simplified and standard case rules; punitive damages; and other matters).
158
See Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997).
159
See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
160
See, e.g., Engalla, 938 P.2d at 922 (holding that medical group may not compel
arbitration where it administers own arbitration program, fraudulently misrepresents speed
of arbitrator selection process, and forces delays); Broemmer v. Abortion Serv. of Phoenix,
840 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Ariz. 1992) (refusing to enforce agreement in "adhesion contract"
where drafter inserted potentially self-serving term requiring sole arbitrator of medical
malpractice claims to be licensed medical doctor); Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of
Disputes Between Consumers and Financial Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer
Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267 (1995) (discussing procedural limitations
of arbitration in treating consumer disputes with banks and lenders); Jean R. Sternlight,
Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding
Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process
Concerns , 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997) (discussing due process concerns with arbitration
under employment and consumer contracts).
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Unconscionability, however, remains the most versatile tool available to
courts.161
B.

History of the Case
In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, the Court confronted the

question whether courts retain any authority to address a defense of
unconscionability aimed at the arbitration provision in an employment
contract when the agreement itself purports to assign sole responsibility for
such decisions to the arbitrator. As is often the case, the majority opinion
contained a surprise: while the First Options line of cases on delegation of
gatekeeping functions was clearly in play, the majority also found a novel
way to draw in the Prima Paint separability doctrine.
Jackson sued his former employer, Rent-A-Center (RAC), for race
discrimination and retaliation; he alleged that he had been repeatedly passed
over for promotions due to his race, and was terminated in retaliation for
complaining. At the time of his employment as an account manager,
Jackson and RAC executed a free-standing, four-page Mutual Agreement to
Arbitrate that provided for “arbitration of all claims or controversies . . .
past, present, or future.”162 It also stated:
The Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court
or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any
dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability,
161

See generally, Bruhl, supra note 2 (As the Supreme Court has shut off most other means
of resisting arbitration, state unconscionability doctrine has become an attractive and
successful tool for striking down arbitration agreements).
162
Jackson v. Rent-A-Ctr., No. 03:07-CV-0050-LRH(RAM), 2007 WL 7030394, at *1 (D.
Nev. June 7, 2007).
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enforceability

or

formation

of

this

Agreement

including, but not limited to any claim that all or any
part of this Agreement is void or voidable.163
When RAC sought to compel arbitration pursuant to the clause, Jackson
argued that the arbitration agreement was itself unenforceable on grounds of
unconscionability, and should be struck down by the court. The district
court, however, granted the employer's motion to compel arbitration. Citing
the First Options line of cases, the court concluded that the agreement to
arbitrate “clearly and unmistakably” gave the arbitrator exclusive authority
to decide whether the arbitration agreement was enforceable.164
Surprisingly, the district court also made reference to the separability
doctrine, citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna165 for the
proposition that “where the contract agreeing to arbitrate is challenged as a
whole, it is for the arbitrator to decide the validity of the agreement.”166
This is, strictly speaking, a misquotation of Buckeye and misapplication (or
at least a novel extension) of the separability principle, which calls upon
courts to permit arbitrators empowered by broad-form arbitration clauses to
address defenses to the contract of which the arbitration provision is a part
(as opposed to defenses to the arbitration provision itself).167 The arguable
163

Id. Extensive, free-standing arbitration agreements appear to be increasingly common in
the employment sphere. To the extent that this approach draws the attention of employees
to the arbitration agreement and the procedural implications of the process, it is a positive
development. Of course, most employees need advice from legal counsel to fully
understand the process. (The author is sometimes asked to review and comment on
employment arbitration agreements.) There is, moreover, the problem of freedom of
choice—which may be more ephemeral than real.
164
Id. at *2 (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (2002)).
165
Id. (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444-45 (2006)).
166
Id.
167
See supra text accompanying notes 86-99.
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conceptual analogy is as follows: in the instant contract the provision
granting the arbitrator exclusive authority respecting disputes about the
“interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of [the arbitration
agreement]” bears the same relationship to the arbitration agreement as a
whole that the typical predispute (executory) arbitration agreement bears to
a contract of which it is a part. This rough analogy was not lost on the
Supreme Court majority, which would embrace the same logic;168 the
dissent would reject the analogy.169
The district court supported its decision with the conclusion that,
even if the court were to have examined Jackson’s assertion of
unconscionability on the merits, the argument would probably fail for lack
of evidence under applicable state law. Like many states, Nevada requires
an agreement to be “both procedurally and substantively unconscionable”—
that is, combining (1) circumstances where a “party lacks a meaningful
opportunity to agree to the terms because of unequal bargaining power or
because the effect of the agreement is not readily understandable” with (2)
“terms which are unfairly one-sided.”170 Jackson’s assertion that the
plaintiff might “have to unfairly pay burdensome arbitration costs” was, the
court concluded, a mere supposition that would not be substantively
unconscionable and would be insufficient to invalidate an agreement.171
168

See infra text accompanying notes 187-192.
See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc v. Jackson 130 S. Ct. 2771, 2781-88 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
170
Jackson v. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc., No. 03:07-CV-0050-LRH(RAM), 2007 WL 7030394,
at *2 (D. Nev. June 7, 2007) (quoting D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 120 Nev. 549, 553-54
(Nev. 2004)).
171
Id. at *3 (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000)). The court
believed this conclusion was reinforced by the fact that the arbitration agreement
“expressly contained a clause allowing the apportionment of costs to be altered in the event
the law require[d] a different allocation of costs to make the [a]greement enforceable.” Id.
The district court did not address two other arguments made by Jackson regarding
169

172

ARBITRATOR AS JUDGE… AND JUDGE OF JURISDICTION SYMPOSIUM

In a 2-1 decision, a panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed,172 holding
the FAA requires that, where a party explicitly challenges an arbitration
clause on the basis of unconscionability, a court and not an arbitrator must
first address the question. This is true, said the appellate court, even where
the agreement's express terms delegate that determination to the
arbitrator(s). Although the separability principle of Prima Paint and
Buckeye gives arbitrators the authority to address challenges to the validity
of the parties’ contract as a whole, the court explained, "when a party
specifically challenges the validity of arbitration provision within a larger
contract, apart from the validity of the contract as a whole, a court decides
the threshold question of the enforceability of the arbitration provisions."173
Before compelling arbitration under FAA Section 4, a court must be
“satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to
comply therewith is not in issue.”174 With respect to provisions that purport
to give arbitrators the authority to decide arbitrability questions, First
Options requires “clear and unmistakable evidence” of agreement.175
Which brings us to the nub of the appellate majority’s decision—the
nature of the evidence to be considered by a court in determining that an
agreement to arbitrate arbitrability is “clear and unmistakable.” It may be
necessary, the majority reasoned, for a court to look beyond seemingly clear

substantive unconscionability—namely, that (1) the provisions of the agreement required
arbitration of claims the employee was likely to bring, but not the claims that the employer
was likely to bring and (2) limitations on discovery in the arbitration agreement were onesided and unfair. See infra text accompanying note 182.
172
Jackson v. Rent-A-Ctr. W., Inc., 581 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2008).
173
Id. at 915.
174
Id. at 916 (quoting Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 4 (2000)).
175
Jackson, 581 F.3d at 915 (quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S.
938, 944 (1995)).
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and unambiguous language of agreement to ascertain whether a party’s
assent was meaningful. In the instant case,
Jackson [the employee] does not dispute that the
language of the Agreement clearly assigns the
arbitrability determination to the arbitrator. What he
does dispute, however, is that he meaningfully agreed
to the terms of the Agreement to Arbitrate, which he
contends

is

procedurally

and

substantively

unconscionable. Jackson argues that, in light of the
parties’ unequal bargaining power, the fact that the
Agreement was presented as a non-negotiable condition
of his employment, and the absence of any meaningful
opportunity to modify the terms of the Agreement, he
did not meaningfully assent to the Agreement.176
First Options and other Supreme Court precedents require arbitration
contracts to be enforced in accordance with “ordinary state-law principles
that govern the enforcement of contracts,”177 and the FAA was designed,
among other things, to put arbitration agreements “upon the same footing as
other contracts.”178 It would be inconsistent with these tenets to say “that
where arbitration provisions—unlike other contractual provisions—are
concerned, clear contractual language is enforceable per se.”179 Therefore,
“where
176

a

party

specifically

challenges

arbitration

provisions

as

Jackson, 581 F.3d at 917 (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting First Options, 514 U.S. at 944).
178
Jackson, 581 F.3d at 917, (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511
(1974)) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-68, at 1-2 (1924)).
179
Jackson, 581 F.3d at 917 (emphasis added).
177
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unconscionable and hence invalid,” a court should have the ability to look
behind the language.180 The appellate panel proceeded to uphold the district
court’s determination that the cost provision in the instant arbitration
agreement was not unconscionable, since Jackson presented no evidence
indicating that the costs of arbitration would actually be prohibitive.181
However, it directed further hearings on two other issues of substantive
unconscionability raised by Jackson—specifically, that the arbitration
agreement’s coverage and discovery terms “were one-sided and unfairly
favored the [e]mployer.”182
In dissent, Circuit Judge Hall emphasized that as arbitration
agreements go, Jackson’s was relatively favorable and lacked key elements
of adhesion.183 Jackson’s allegations that the agreement was a nonnegotiable condition of employment appeared to be contradicted by the
agreement itself, and his substantive complaints about the agreement were
“thinner than most.”184 Such “bare allegations,” he argued, should not give
cause for a judicial mini-trial on unconscionability, especially since the
contract “clearly and unmistakably” assigns such issues to the arbitrator.

180

Id. at 918-919. The court distinguished a number of decisions which enforced provisions
for the arbitration of arbitrability in the context of “agreements between sophisticated
commercial entities.” Id. It cited with approval Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 554 F.3d 7
(1st Cir. 2009), a case involving an action by a class of franchisees against a corporation
for fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract and violations of various labor laws. In that
case the First Circuit ruled that a party challenging a provision empowering arbitrators to
rule on arbitrability issues “is entitled to have a court determine whether ‘the arbitration
remedy is illusory.’” Id. at 13. The concern, the court explained, was not with
unconscionability—essentially a fairness issue—but more narrowly with whether the
arbitration regime here is structured so as to prevent a litigant from having access to the
arbitrator to resolve claims, including unconscionability defenses. Id.
181
Jackson, 581 F.3d at 919.
182
Id. at 920.
183
See id. (Hall, J., dissenting).
184
See id. (Hall, J., dissenting) (citing Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1267
(9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)).
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Hall concluded that the majority’s decision was an inappropriate expansion
of First Options and other cited precedents, and, for circumstances where
parties appear to have agreed to arbitrate arbitrability, proposed a more
limited “gateway” role for district courts in policing unconscionability and
related concerns,
perhaps permitting courts to remain attuned to “wellsupported” claims of unconscionability or the potential
that arbitration might be illusory, while still resolving
“any doubts” as to what the parties agreed in favor of
arbitration.185
C.

The Court’s Decision: Once More to the Fount of Federal
Substantive Law
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard arguments in the

case; the result was, once again, a 5-4 decision reversing the judgment of
the court of appeals.186 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia spurned the
logic of the Ninth Circuit majority respecting the First Options line of cases
and embraced the district court’s extension of Prima Paint separability
principles. Tapping once again the increasingly deep well of substantive
arbitration law under the FAA, Scalia’s opinion makes clear that where a
contract “clearly and unmistakably” delegates gateway questions to

185

Jackson, 581 F.3d at 921-922 (citing Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 554 F.3d 7, 13
(1st Cir. 2009)). Judge Hall pointed out that in the Awuah decision favorably cited by the
majority, the First Circuit insisted that a litigant meet a “high burden” to show that
arbitration was “truly illusory.” Id. at 921-922 (citing Awuah, 554 F.3d at 13).
186
See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
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arbitrators, unconscionability challenges must be focused on the delegation
provision alone.
Scalia begins by singling out for separate consideration two
provisions in the parties’ lengthy agreement to arbitrate, both of which
purport “to settle by arbitration a controversy” as described by FAA Section
2: (1) the basic provision calling for arbitration of “‘past, present or future’
disputes arising out of [the employment contract]” and (2) the provision
delegating “gateway” issues to the arbitrator (“[t]he Arbitrator … shall have
exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the … enforceability
… of this Agreement.”)187 The controversy at issue is the alleged
unconscionability of the agreement, and the provision Rent-A-Center seeks
to enforce is the second, “delegation” provision. Such a provision is readily
enforceable under the First Options line of cases.188 Furthermore, explains
Scalia,
[it] is simply an additional, antecedent agreement the
party seeking arbitration asks the federal court to
enforce, and the FAA operates on this additional
arbitration agreement just as it does on any other. …
[It] is valid under § 2 “save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
While the parties’ intent to arbitrate arbitrability issues must be established
by “clear and unmistakable evidence,” this is an “‘interpretive rule’ based

187

Id. at 2777 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983)).
188
See Rent-A-Ctr. W., 130 S. Ct. at 2777-79.
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on an assumption about parties’ expectations.189 It does not, Scalia insists,
embrace questions of validity (including alleged unconscionability), which
are the province of FAA Section 2. Scalia and the Court majority thereby
reject the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that unconscionability is inextricably
intertwined with proof of intent under First Options and progeny.
Scalia instead employs the doctrine of severability (separability) to
determine the allocation of functions between courts and arbitrators in the
presence of a provision delegating “gateway” provisions to arbitrators. To
paraphrase Scalia’s argument, a special provision empowering arbitrators to
address issues relating to arbitrability, including the enforceability of the
arbitration agreement, operates within an arbitration agreement in a manner
directly analogous to the operation of a standard arbitration provision that
provides for resolution of all disputes arising under or relating to the
contract within which it is contained. Under Prima Paint and progeny,
therefore, defenses to the whole agreement should normally be addressed by
the arbitrators, but courts (under FAA Section 2 or the implementing
sections FAA Section 3 or Section 4) should address defenses specifically
aimed at the validity of the agreement to arbitrate (in this case, the
delegation provision).190 Scalia insists that there is no reason why
“delegation” clauses cannot be severed from the remainder of arbitration
agreements in the same way that arbitration provisions are severed from the
remainder of the contract within which they are contained—the rule should
be the same under Section 2. Henceforth, the Court majority’s expansive

189
190

Id. at 2777 (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)).
Rent-A-Ctr W.., 130 S. Ct. at 2778.
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application of the severability doctrine will be a “matter of substantive
federal arbitration law” and not state law under the FAA.191
Unfortunately for him, Jackson’s unconscionability challenge was to
the whole arbitration agreement, and not just the delegation provision. His
assertions regarding substantive unconscionability were focused on the
kinds of claims subject to the arbitration agreement, arbitration costs and
discovery. None bore any relation to the agreement to let arbitrators
determine arbitrability,192 and were therefore irrelevant to the enforceability
of the delegation clause under Section 2.
Justice Stevens’ dissent on behalf of four members of the Court took
strong issue with the majority’s “breezy assertion” that arbitration
agreements could be treated analogously to other kinds of contracts in
applying Prima Paint severability doctrine. The latter, Stevens explains, is
“akin to a pleading standard” that parties must follow to trigger a court’s
consideration of the validity of an arbitration clause. The court’s usual
function as gatekeeper of arbitrability issues is taken over by arbitrators
only when the arbitration agreement “clearly and unmistakably” evinces the
parties’ mutual intent to re-allocate that function. To Stevens and the
dissent, like the Ninth Circuit majority, a determination of the parties’ intent
must take into account whether an agreement is unconscionable, since
unconscionability implicates questions of meaningful choice and assent.193

191

Id. at 2783.
Id. at 2780.
193
Justice Stevens quotes the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §208, comment d
(1979):
Gross inequality of bargaining power, together with terms
unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, may confirm
indications that the transaction involved elements of deception or
compulsion, or may show that the weaker party had no meaningful
192
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To Stevens, the majority’s employment of severability doctrine
within an agreement to arbitrate—described as “a new layer of
severability—something akin to Russian nesting dolls”194 was wholly
inconsistent with prior precedent, which categorically reserved general
challenges to the making of an arbitration agreement to courts. It takes the
always-controversial doctrine of Prima Paint too far. Severability as
originally defined by that decision was justified on the basis that to permit a
court to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the basis of defects in the
“container”

contract
195

arbitration.”

would

defeat

the

“national

policy

favoring

Severing the delegation clause, however, could not be said to

achieve similar policy goals;196 since it would do no more than determine
who addresses gateway issues.197
In Rent-A-Center, neither the majority nor the dissent offers pristine
logic in favor of their respective positions. Scalia’s attempt—in a
footnote—to summarily dispose of the Ninth Circuit’s and dissent’s
argument that a determination of the parties’ “clear and unmistakable”
intent to arbitrate arbitrability issues fails to explain why allegations of
unconscionability may not be relevant to that determination. It is clear that
concerns about judicial determinations of unconscionability are virtually
always bound up in concerns about the practical realities of assent in mass
contracting, and the relative lack of information and leverage possessed by
choice, no real alternative, or did not in fact assent or appear to
asset to the unfair terms.
In a footnote, Stevens acknowledged that some of employee Jackson’s arguments might be
directed not to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement as a whole but rather to
individual contract terms, and might be properly for the arbitrator. Rent-A-Ctr., W., 130 S.
Ct. at 2784 n.7.
194
Rent-A-Ctr., W., 130 S. Ct. at 2786.
195
Id. at 2787-88.
196
Id.
197
Id.
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adhering parties. On the other hand, neither the Ninth Circuit nor the
dissenting Justices squarely address the impact of a provision specifically
delegating arbitrability to arbitrators, nor clearly explain why this should
not call for a more nuanced judicial consideration of unconscionabilitybased arguments.
D.

Implications of Rent-A-Center
Within the wide purview of the FAA, the practical significance of

Rent-A-Center is great. The “projection” of clauses delegating to
arbitrators’ authority to address the validity and enforceability of the
arbitration agreement, rendered relatively ironclad by the Court majority’s
aggressive interpretation of past precedents, into the realm of mass contracts
is especially troubling. The Court has availed itself of the vastly malleable
and expandable concept of federal arbitration law to dramatically limit
lower courts’ use of their most effective tools for policing overreaching in
arbitration agreements, notably unconscionability. The concept of
“separability” and the related notion that arbitrators may be empowered to
decide their own jurisdiction, and inconsistent with general concepts of
contract interpretation, but nevertheless enjoy wide application in the world
of commercial arbitration because they support the independence and
autonomy of those systems from courts.198 Where the same concepts are
employed beyond the commercial context, however, they arguably strike at
the very heart of the FAA scheme itself. Testifying in favor of the FAA as a
mechanism for overcoming historical judicial resistance to enforcing
198

See James M. Gaitis, Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson and the Ongoing
Assault on Party Autonomy, available at http://www.karlbayer.com/blog/?p=9732
(last visited Nov. 2, 2010).
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predispute arbitration agreements, Julius Henry Cohen explained the
rationale for judicial control of gateway determinations under the FAA
Section 4:
[T]he fundamental reason for [judicial resistance was
that] people were not able to take care of themselves in
making contracts, and stronger men would take
advantage of the weaker, and the courts had to come in
and protect them. … And that is still true to a certain
extent. … [Therefore a]t the outset the party who has
refused to arbitrate because he believes in good faith
that his agreement does not bind him to arbitrate, or that
the agreement is not applicable to the controversy, is
protected by the provision of the law which requires the
court to examine into the merits of such a claim.199
From now on, the presence of clear “delegation” language in arbitration
agreements will mean that the judicial “gatekeeper” role is limited to
consideration of defenses specifically aimed at the delegation provision
itself. Thus, in the presence of a delegation provision (which will, needless
to say, become ubiquitous), it will be necessary for a party seeking to avoid
arbitration to demonstrate that the arbitrator selection mechanism is
unfair—as where the other party has unilateral control over the selection of
the arbitrators (either through the appointment process or through
manipulation of the underlying pool of arbitrators), or where there are
199

See David Horton, The Mandatory Core of Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 96
VA.
L.
REV.
IN
BRIEF
1
(2010),
available
at
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2010/04/02/horton.pdf.
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demonstrable conflicts of interest on the part of arbitrators or administrative
bodies helping with selection.200 A party seeking to avoid arbitration will
not be able to raise a litany of concerns about other elements of the
arbitration agreement—those relating to costs, discovery, nature and
location of hearings, form of award, kinds of remedies, etc.—unless they
can be shown to have an impact on the validity of the delegation provision.
This approach significantly further minimizes the judicial policing function
and places even greater responsibilities on the shoulders of private
arbitrators who may be called upon to address a variety of fairness issues.
Judicial intervention in the arbitration process will be largely confined to
post-award procedures under the limited grounds set forth in the FAA or
analogous state arbitration statutes—grounds which, as a general principle,
prohibit courts from inquiring into the merits of arbitral decision-making
and accord arbitrator discretion significant deference.201
While this arrangement will be acceptable—even highly desirable—
in most forms of business-to-business arbitration, it is likely to underline the
fears of consumer and employee advocates who see Rent-A-Center as a
dramatic narrowing of the potential range of protection against the threat of
procedural abuse under arbitration agreements.
Such advocates are unlikely to draw comfort from Granite Rock Co. v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters,202 published right after Rent-A-Center,
which restates and reinforces the formalistic approach of that decision. The Court,

200

See Raquel A. Rodriguez & B. Ted Howes, Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Jackson—Who Is The
Proper ‘Gatekeeper’ of Arbitrability? Divided Supreme Court Reverses Ninth Circuit in
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 25 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 1 (July 2010)
(litigant challenging a delegation provision “must specifically allege that the delegation
provision itself is fraudulent, the subject of undue influence or duress, or unconscionable”).
201
See supra note 99 & accompanying text.
202
Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).

THE STRUGGLE TO SHAPE AMERICAN ARBITRATION

183

in decision authored by Justice Thomas,203 cites Firsts Options and Rent-A-Center
in the course of instructing lower courts regarding the “proper framework” for
handling of arbitrability issues under federal statutes204:

Under that framework, a court may order arbitration of
a particular dispute only where the court is satisfied that
the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute. To satisfy
itself that such agreement exists, the court must resolve
any issue that calls into question the formation or
applicability of the specific arbitration clause that a
party seeks to have the court enforce. Where there is no
provision validly committing them to an arbitrator,
these issues typically concern the scope of the
arbitration clause and its enforceability. In addition,
these issues always include whether the clause was
agreed to, and may include whether that agreement was
formed.205
Thomas’ “framework” appears to consciously distinguish questions involving “the
scope of an arbitration clause or its enforceability,” which he indicates may be
referable to arbitrators by appropriate (“clear and unmistakable”) agreement, from
questions about whether the clause was agreed to, or when it was formed. In this
way Thomas in Granite Rock, like Scalia in Rent-A-Center, appears to be
203

In a 7-2 decision the Court overturned yet another Ninth Circuit decision involving
arbitration—this in the setting of a labor/management dispute. The Court held that a
dispute over a collective bargaining agreement’s ratification date was a matter for the
District Court, not an arbitrator, to resolve.
204
Although the decision involves a collective bargaining agreement, Thomas freely mixes
labor and FAA precedents.
205
Granite Rock Co., 130 S. Ct. at 2856 (internal citations omitted).
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conceptually separating questions of bare, formal assent, which are inescapably for
the courts, from questions about the enforceability or validity of the arbitration
agreement, which may be allocated to arbitrators (and again, are very likely to be
so allocated in future standardized contracts of adhesion).
Thomas also reminds us that even the “presumption of arbitrability,”
which reflects the FAA’s “commitment to ‘overrule the judiciary’s longstanding
refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the
same footing as other contracts,”206 is subject to the principle of assent that is the
foundation of arbitration. “Nor,” Thomas’ opinion continues, “have we held that
courts may use policy considerations as a substitute for party agreement.”207
On one level, Granite Rock may be read as nothing more than affirmation
of the “bedrock” principle of assent—and the court’s traditional gateway role in
policing assent—that is at the heart of the FAA. Seen in the context of current
Court jurisprudence, however, the announced framework and cautionary dictum on
policy appear to reflect the Court’s self-described commitment to enforcing
arbitration agreements according to their formal, literal terms, unfiltered by other
policies except and to the extent divined by the Court in its reading of the FAA and
the seemingly inexhaustible wellspring of “federal substantive law.”208

As the U.S. Supreme Court dramatically limits the judicial oversight
of arbitration agreements in contracts of adhesion, it is appropriate to view
its actions against the backdrop of legislative or judicial responses to the
206

Id. at 2859.
Id.
208
Criticizing Scalia’s rationale in Rent-A-Center (and the general trend of recent decisions
by the Court), one thoughtful observer of arbitration concluded:
The Court’s resolution... illustrates the conservative majority’s
willingness to purport to base its decisions on the precepts of party
autonomy when it suits the majority’s ideological objective and to
disregard those same precepts when the majority’s ideological
objective so requires.
James M. Gaitis, Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson and the Ongoing Assault on
Party Autonomy, http://www.karlbayer.com/blog/?p=9732 (last visited Nov. 2,
2010).
207
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same concerns in other parts of the world.209 The Court’s continuing
promotion of arbitration falls in line with the expansive “unfettered market”
approach to the international economic order that was widely embraced in
the wake of World War II.210 In Rent-A-Center the U.S. Supreme Court
dramatically limits the purview of judicial policing of unconscionable
arbitration agreements by enforcing a delegation clause situating nearly all
gate keeping functions in the hands of the arbitrator—save defenses relating
directly to the delegation clause itself.
As previously stated, the proposition that arbitrators have authority
to resolve issues relating to their own jurisdiction, including the
enforceability of the arbitration agreement and related scope questions, is
generally uncontroversial in the international arena.211 In other jurisdictions
209

See generally, Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S.
Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to that of the Rest of the
World?, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831 (2002) [hereinafter “Sternlight”]; Christopher R.
Drahozal & Raymond J. Friel, Consumer Arbitration in the European Union and the
United States, 28 N.C.J. INT’L. & COM. REG. 357 (2003); Catherine A. Rogers, The Arrival
of the “Have-Nots” in International Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 341 (2007); BORN, supra note
99, at 817-829; SÉBASTIEN BESSON & JEAN-FRANCOIS POUDRET, DROIT COMPARÉ DE
L’ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL, (Deutsche Bibliothek, 2002), [hereinafter, POUDRET &
BESSON], ¶366. See also Dirk Otto and Omaia Elwan, V(2), in KRONKE HERBERT &
NACIMIENTO, PATRICIA (EDS.) RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL
AWARDS: A GLOBAL COMMENTARY ON THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 345, 360-61 (2010)
[hereinafter Otto & Elwan] (“With regard to arbitration agreements, states may either
prohibit the arbitration of certain consumer disputes entirely or require a specific and
separate written arbitration agreement that is designed to effectively inform customers that
they are about to waive recourse to state courts”).
210

John Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in
the Post-War Economic Order, 36 INT’L J. 379 (1982) [hereinafter Ruggie]; Dani Rodrik, The
Global Governance of Trade: As If Development Really Mattered, United Nations
Development Programme, July 2001, at 14.
211
Arbitration Act 1996, § 30 (England); UNCITRAL Model Law art. 16; French NCPC art.
1466; ICC Rules art. 6(2); LCIA Rules art. 23. For further discussion on this issue see William
Park, The Arbitrator's Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES, VOL.
13, (Kluwer Law International, 2006), pp. 55-146; Virginie Colaiuta, The Similarity of Aims in
the American and French Legal Systems With Respect to Arbitrators' Powers to Determine
Their Jurisdiction, 13 ICCA CONGRESS SERIES 154, pp. 154-166 [hereinafter Colaiuta].
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globally, moreover, the concept of class actions does not exist, although
their equivalent may be achieved by way of multi-party arbitrations or
through a body acting as a representative for a class of people who have
been affected by the same issue.212 However, the vast majority of non-U.S.
jurisdictions have taken steps to protect their consumers and employees,213
including those jurisdictions that have adopted strong pro-arbitration
policies. The protection is usually achieved by either proscribing predispute
arbitration agreements in consumer and employment contracts, or by
placing certain conditions or limitations on such agreements.214 In many
cases, courts have applied statutory or common law standards for policing
fairness in a manner akin to the approaches of many lower federal and state
courts in the United States.215
Thus, U.S. Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence makes the
U.S. less protective of the procedural rights of consumers and employees
than almost any other jurisdiction in the world. In the words of one
commentator:
[d]espite the U.S. … [Court’s] statements to the
contrary, one might be tempted to conclude that there is
evidence of convergence in most western legal systems
212

Various jurisdictions differ greatly on this point, but most differ procedurally from the
classic notion of class actions as found in U.S. law.
213
It is this distinction in the definition of the term ‘commercial’ that has lead to consumer
and employment protections being stronger in countries outside of the U.S., as most
jurisdictions outside the U.S. consider such relationships to be non-commercial, whereas,
in the U.S., they are still considered commercial. See BORN, supra note 99, at 262-264).
See also, Karen Stewart & Joseph Matthews, Comment, Online Arbitration of Cross
Border Business to Consumer Disputes, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1111, 1136 (2002).
214
215

BORN, supra note 99, at 817-829.
Id. at 820.
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against the enforcement of pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts and in favor of
the maintenance of consumers’ access to state courts for
the resolution of their disputes. To do so might involve
concluding that the current situation in the U.S. … is an
anomaly flowing from a specific statutory instrument
particular to American federal law.216
Rent-A-Center and Stolt-Nielsen do by no means represent the end of the
debate over arbitration policy and practice in the United States. The
concerns underlying these decisions have lent significant momentum to
efforts in Congress to outlaw predispute arbitration agreements in
consumer, employment and other categories of contracts.217 These efforts
have already led to the passage of laws significantly limiting the role of
arbitration in some employment and consumer settings;218 they may
eventually affect not only the whole spectrum of consumer and employment
contracts but also the broad realm of business-to-business arbitration.

216

Geneviève Saumier, Consumer Arbitration in the Evolving Canadian Landscape, 113
PENN ST. L. REV. 1203, 1226 (2009).
217
Beware the Fine Print, NEW YORK TIMES, June 26, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/27/opinion/27sun2.html?_r=1&ref=supreme_court.
218

See infra text accompanying notes 226-235.
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V.

THE PENDULUM SWINGS: PENDING U.S. LEGISLATION
ARBITRATION

A.

Mounting Efforts at Reform

ON

BINDING

For many years the Supreme Court has pursued a course of maximal
enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements across virtually the whole
spectrum of civil claims and controversies, including arbitration agreements
in standardized contracts of adhesion. It has done so in full recognition of
the ability of Congress to enact contrary legislation, and has drawn attention
to Congressional inaction in the course of giving full play the discerned
penumbra of “federal substantive law” surrounding the FAA.219
Now, Congress and the Executive Branch have taken responsive
steps reflecting less sanguine views of the operation of arbitration
provisions. These initiatives reflect the other side of debate, championed by
some consumer and employee advocates and academics, which focuses on
real or potential abuses of private justice. The complaints have mounted
significantly in recent years with the publication of a Public Citizen report
documenting the unfortunate experiences of individuals in consumer
arbitration,220 the much-publicized plight of a young rape victim required to
arbitrate her claims,221 and the Minnesota Attorney General’s allegations of

219

See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991); Richard Nagareda,
The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class Action, NOTRE DAME L. REV.
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1670722).
220
See
Public
Citizen
Report,
available
at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf.
221
See, e.g., Wade Goodwyn, Rape Case Highlights Arbitration Debate, June 9, 2009,
available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105153315 (last visited Nov. 4,
2010).
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fraud against a provider of consumer credit card arbitration services.222 The
same concerns have stimulated regular proposals in Congress to limit or
regulate predispute arbitration agreements. These efforts reached a
crescendo in the wake of the 2008 election.
During 2009 and the first half of 2010, Congress proposed over a
dozen measures addressing the issue of mandatory binding arbitration.223
These included attempts to limit the enforcement of arbitration agreements
in very specific categories, such as the Rape Victims Act of 2009,224 which
would prevent employers, engaged in interstate commerce, from enforcing
otherwise valid pre-dispute arbitration agreements where the employees suit
222

Joshua Freed, Bank of America Drops Arbitration Requirement, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug.
13, 2009), available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2009657887_apusbankofameric
aarbitration.html?syndication=bondheads. Firm Agrees to End Role in Arbitrating Card
(July
20,
2009),
available
at
Debt,
N.Y.
TIMES
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/business/20credit.html.
223
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009) (invalidating predispute arbitration agreements in the consumer, employment, franchise, and civil rights
context); Consumer Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 99, 111th Cong. (2009) (invalidating predispute arbitration agreements in the consumer context); Consumer Financial Protection
Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. (2009) (establishing Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau with ability to limit use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements); Fairness
in Nursing Home Arbitration Act, S. 512, 111th Cong. (2009) (invalidating pre-dispute
arbitration agreements between long-term care facilities and the elderly); Labor Relations
First Contract Negotiations Act of 2009, H.R. 243, 111th Cong. (2009) (requiring
arbitration of initial contract disputes); Payday Loan Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1214, 111th
Cong. (2009) (listing mandatory unfair arbitration clause as illegal element of loan
contract); Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices Reduction Act, H.R. 2108, 111th Cong.
(2009) (invalidating all consumer pre-dispute arbitration agreements); Rape Victims Act of
2009, S. 2915, 111th Cong. (2009) (invalidating all pre-dispute arbitration agreements
where the tort alleged was rape); Service Members Access to Justice Act of 2009, H.R.
1474, 111th Cong. (2009) (invalidating pre-dispute arbitration agreements under
USERRA); Taxpayer Abuse Prevention Act, S. 585, 111th Cong. (2009) (invalidating predispute arbitration agreement in contract between lendor and lendee in anticipation of
income tax return).
It is worth noting that many of the anti-arbitration provisions covered in these acts
would fall under the protected categories listed in the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009.
Also, a number of the proposed restrictions on lending practices are already covered in the
recently passed Consumer Protection Act. See infra text accompanying notes 228-235.
224
Rape Victims Act of 2009, S. 2915, 111th Cong. (2009).
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alleges rape, and the Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act, 225 which
would invalidate all pre-dispute arbitration agreements between long term
care facilities and their residents.
Although most of the proposed legislation is still pending, some
relevant bills have become law. The 2010 Department of Defense
Appropriations Act (“Defense Act”),226 signed by President Obama in late
2009, included a provision that prohibits federal contractors who receive
funds under the Act for contracts in excess of $1,000,000 from requiring
their employees or independent contractors to arbitrate “claims involving
Title VII of the civil rights act or any tort arising out of alleged sexual
assault or harassment.”227
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Consumer Protection Act”)228 has the potential to effect sweeping reforms
with regard to mandatory binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the
broad arenas of consumer finance and investment. Signed into law by
President Obama on July 21, 2010, the Consumer Protection Act contains
several different provisions that aim to restrict or to consider possible
restrictions in the use of predispute arbitration agreements.229 Under the
provisions of Section 748(n)(1-2) and Section 922, the Act provides special
225
226
227

Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act, S. 512, 111th Cong. (2009).
See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, H.R. 3326, 111th Cong. § 8116 (2010).

See John J. Roddy, Emerging Perspectives on the Fundamental Fairness of Mandatory
Arbitration Coupled with Class Action Bans, 1789 PLI/Corp 1105, (Apr 8-9, 2010) at
1126; Zachary D. Fasman, The New Developments in Employment Class Actions, 833
PLI/Lit 575, (Sep. 27-28, 2010) at 705.
228
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th
Cong. (2010) (“Consumer Protection Act”).
229
The exception is a provision relating to reinsurance agreements and the rights and duties
of the ceding insurer. Under §531(b)(1) the state law of the state that is not the domicile
state of the ceding insurer is preempted if it restricts or eliminates the insurer’s rights to
contractual arbitration.
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protections and incentives to whistleblowers.230 An employee cannot waive
his right to a judicial forum regarding a dispute that arises under the
whistleblower protection section of the act.231 This prevents an employer
covered under the section from forcing arbitration of the issue of whether a
particular employee qualifies for the extensive enumerated protections
listed under the section.232 Section 1414 amends the Truth in Lending Act to
provide that no mortgage lender may include a pre-dispute arbitration
clause in their loan agreements.233
The Consumer Protection Act is largely concerned with regulation
of the newly established Consumer Financial Protections Bureau (“CFPB”).
Section 1057 provides general whistleblower protection to all employees of
companies and individuals who fall under the auspices of the CFPB,234 and,
furthermore, that “no predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or
enforceable to the extent that it requires arbitration of a dispute arising
under this section.”235
B.

The Arbitration Fairness Act
Of all the recent or proposed enactments, however, the most

sweeping is the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,236 which would prevent
the use and enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in all
230

Id., §748(n)(1-2) & §922.
Id.
232
§748(n) adds a whistleblower protection section to the Commodities Exchange Act and
§ amends Title 18’s pre-existing whistleblower protection section. Id. § 748(n).
233
Compare Consumer Protection Act, § 1414(e) with Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2010, H.R. 3326, 111th Cong. (2010) (noting the absence and presence
of a prohibition on the enforcement of existing pre-dispute agreements).
234
Consumer Protection Act at § 1057.
235
Id.
236
Arbitation Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009).
231
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consumer, employment, franchise contracts, and with respect to claims
under disputes under statutes protecting civil rights.
There are currently two versions of the Arbitration Fairness Act
(AFA) in Congress. The House Bill (H.R. 1020)237 is intended to amend
Section 2 of the FAA to provide that:
(b) No pre-dispute arbitration agreement shall be valid
or enforceable if it requires arbitration of—
(1) an employment, consumer, or franchise dispute; or
(2) a dispute arising under any statute intended to
protect civil rights.
(c) An issue as to whether this chapter applies to an
arbitration agreement shall be determined by Federal
law. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the
validity or enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate
shall be determined by the court, rather than the
arbitrator, irrespective of whether the party resisting
arbitration

challenges

the

arbitration

agreement

specifically or in conjunction with other terms of the
contract containing such agreement.
(d) Nothing in this chapter shall apply to any arbitration
provision in a collective bargaining agreement.238

237
238

Id.
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009).
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The Senate version of the bill is very similar, but proposes to incorporate
modifications to the FAA within a separate new section.239 Both bills
outlaw

predispute

arbitration

agreements

respecting

employment,

240

consumer, franchise, or statutory civil rights disputes.

Ever since the AFA was first introduced in 2007, it has stimulated
considerable debate among lawyers and scholars.241 Both current bills are
improvements over the vague language of the now-deceased Arbitration

239

Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009) § 3(a) provides as follows:
(a) In General. Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no
predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it
requires arbitration of an employment, consumer, franchise, or
civil rights dispute.
(b) Applicability.
(1) In general. An issue as to whether this chapter applies to an
arbitration agreement shall be determined under Federal law. The
applicability of this chapter to an agreement to arbitrate and the
validity and enforceability of an agreement to which this chapter
applies shall be determined by the court, rather than the arbitrator,
irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration challenges the
arbitration agreement specifically or in conjunction with other
terms of the contract containing such agreement.
(2) Collective bargaining agreements. Nothing in this chapter shall
apply to any arbitration provision in a contract between an
employer and a labor organization or between labor organizations,
except that no such arbitration provision shall have the effect of
waiving the right of an employee to seek judicial enforcement of a
right arising under a provision of the Constitution of the United
States, a State constitution, or a Federal or State statute, or public
policy arising therefrom.
240
Both the House and Senate versions include exclusions for collective bargaining,
although the Senate version provides that even in a collective bargaining situation an
employee cannot waive any statutory or constitutional rights (an apparent effort to reverse
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S.Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009), holding “that a collectivebargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate
ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law”). Another major difference in the
two bills is that the Senate version creates a new, discrete section in the FAA, whereas, the
House bill acts as an amendment to §2.
241
See, Shirley M. Hufstedler and William H. Webster, Arbitration under Siege, NAT’L.
L.J. (Sept. 20, 2010), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202472117839&slreturn=1&hbxlogin
=1.
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Fairness Act of 2007, which provided for the non-enforceability of disputes
under "any statute intended to protect civil rights or to regulate contracts or
transactions between parties of unequal bargaining power."242 The failure to
provide more specific definition for the classes of affected statutes
(affecting “civil rights”) creates a grey area of non-enforceability that may
be exploited by parties seeking to avoid or to delay the commencement of
arbitration, undermining conventional expectations regarding arbitration's
efficiency and economy of process.
This effect is dramatically compounded by a clause providing that
"the validity or enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate shall be
determined by the court, rather than the arbitrator…"243 In the House
version of the AFA this provision applies to any kind of arbitration
agreement, without regard to the parties' sophistication or the way in which
the parties struck an agreement to arbitrate. The practical result is to deny
enforcement to provisions, now ubiquitous in domestic and international
commercial arbitration procedures that promote efficiency by vouchsafing
enforcement and "jurisdictional" questions to arbitrators. The impact of this
provision is rendered far greater by a materially ambiguous provision that
gives courts initial authority to address not only "challenges [of] the
arbitration agreement specifically," but also challenges to the arbitration
provision "in conjunction with other terms of the contract containing such
agreement." This provision undermines the separability principle first
enunciated in Prima Paint244 treating predispute arbitration agreements are
separable from the contracts of which they are a part for the purposes of
assessing their enforceability under the terms of the FAA. While such a
242

Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007).
Id. at § 4(c).
244
See supra text accompanying notes 86-91.
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limitation may be appropriate in the context of certain categories of
contracts, which are normally adhesive, such as employment or consumer
contracts, it is wholly inconsistent with expectations in the typical businessto-business setting.245 Professor Emmanuel Gaillard warned that the act
"pos[es] a serious threat to the promotion of efficient international dispute
resolution and of the United States as a friendly place to arbitrate."246
A final concern raised by the AFA is its categorical prohibition of
arbitration agreements in franchise agreements. While many countries have
outlawed or restricted the use of predispute arbitration agreements in
consumer or employment contracts, research has revealed no statutory
prohibitions or regulations respecting arbitration provisions in franchise
agreements anywhere else in the world with the exception of Puerto Rico.247
Thus, where arbitration is readily available to private parties as a mean of
resolving disputes, no distinction is made with respect to arbitration
agreements contained in franchise contracts.
C.

A More Considered Approach?
A framework for more thoughtful and discrete consideration of the

operation of arbitration agreements in consumer settings may have been
245

See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1
at 35-49.
246
Emmanuel Gaillard, International Arbitration Law, 2008 N.Y.L.J. 3 at 3.
247
Even in Puerto Rico, however, there is no outright prohibition on such agreements. The
Puerto Rico Dealers’ Contracts Act requires that a court, before enforcing an arbitration
provision in a franchise contract, determine that the provision “was subscribed freely and
voluntarily by both parties.” P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, § 278b-3 (1964). Moreover, the law
creates a rebuttable presumption that any arbitration provision in a franchise contract “was
included or subscribed at the request of the principal or grantor” and “is an adhesion
contract to be interpreted and made effective as such.” Getting the deal through, Franchise
in 33 jurisdictions worldwide, 2009 – Puerto Rico Chapter at p. 150.
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established under certain provisions of the previously mentioned Consumer
Protection Act.248 Instead of an outright prohibition on predispute
arbitration agreements, the Act may permit a process of deliberate
investigation, reflection and debate about the role of arbitration in specific
settings. Section 1028 of the Act gives the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) broad power to regulate all pre-dispute arbitration contracts
in the area of consumer financial products and services.249 It is directed to
study and prepare a report to Congress on the use of predispute arbitration
agreements “in connection with the offering or providing of consumer
financial products or services.”250 If deemed to be in the public interest, it
“may prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use” of such
agreements.”251 Section 928 provides the Securities and Exchange

248

See Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010)..
Consumer Protection Act at §1028 provides:
(a)
STUDY AND REPORT.--The Bureau shall conduct a study of,
and shall provide a report to Congress concerning, the use of
agreements providing for arbitration of any future dispute between
covered persons and consumers in connection with the offering or
providing of consumer financial products or services.
(b)
FURTHER AUTHORITY.--The Bureau, by regulation, may
prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of an
agreement between a covered person and a consumer for a
consumer financial product or service providing for arbitration of
any future dispute between the parties, if the Bureau finds that such
a prohibition or imposition of conditions or limitations is in the
public interest and for the protection of consumers. The findings in
such rule shall be consistent with the study conducted under
subsection (a).
(c)
LIMITATION.--The authority described in subsection (b) may not
be construed to prohibit or restrict a consumer from entering into a
voluntary arbitration agreement with a covered person after a
dispute has arisen.
250
Id. at § 1028(a).
251
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Commission (“SEC”) with the same power with regards to securities
products and services.252
It is hard to predict at this point what if any recommendations will
result from the CFPB and SEC studies. Especially in the realm of securities
arbitration, complaints about the system are balanced and perhaps
outweighed by the track record of programs that have been overseen by the
SEC and related entities such as the Securities Industry Conference on
Arbitration.253 Moreover, the passage of the new bill may have encouraged
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) to announce a new
regulatory proposal to make permanent its pilot “all-public” arbitrator
program.254 Henceforth, investors will have the opportunity to appoint a
panel of three arbitrators, none of whom have affiliations with the securities
industry; the requirement of a single “industry” arbitrator—long a focus of
complaints by investor advocates—will be eliminated.255
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Id. at § 928.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence under the FAA is an

extended exercise in shoring up the bulwarks of private, binding dispute
resolution in furtherance of the presumed intent of contracting parties.
While its staunchest adherents may insist that the Court’s reticence is
justified as effectively promoting pro-arbitration policies under the FAA
(announced and repeatedly reinforced by the Court since the mid-1980s)
and in requiring lower courts to be measured and precise in the handling of
defenses, many are now convinced that the Court has not done enough to
address the problems of arbitration in standardized contracts of adhesion.
The Court’s most recent decisions, far from alleviating these concerns, have
pronounced significant new limits on judicial oversight of arbitration
agreements in the course of further expanding the purview of federal proarbitration policy.
The Court’s seeming inflexibility is a significant contributor to
momentum building in Congress for legislation to dramatically restrict the
use of predispute arbitration agreements in consumer, employment and
franchise agreements.256 While Congressional efforts to address widespread
concerns about arbitration agreements in adhesion settings reflect to some
extent predominant approaches to the protection of consumers and
employees around the world, they also raise legitimate concerns. In
particular, the breadth and ambiguity of the Arbitration Fairness Act, and
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the potential impact of the statute on international transactions, is of great
concern to the international business community.257
As recent elections have brought about a change in the political
climate in Washington, an optimistic view might foresee the opportunity for
thoughtful, relatively dispassionate consideration of the operation of
arbitration agreements within discrete transactional and relational settings.
For example, the current initiatives aimed at examining arbitration in the
context of financial services contracts and agreements between securities
investors and brokers258 offer the possibility for bringing forth and
considering relevant data about the costs and benefits of arbitration for
consumers. The history and evolution of regulated securities arbitration will
also afford a basis for consideration of that model as an alternative to
unregulated arbitration, or to outright prohibition of arbitration in such
settings.259
Another possible “middle ground” measure would be the
implementation of minimum due process guidelines for employment or
consumer arbitration—a notion suggested by various due process standards
developed under private or quasi-public auspices in the 1990s.260 A
proposed Model Arbitration Act aimed at establishing due process
guidelines for employment arbitration is among the alternative concepts
now being discussed by concerned individuals and groups.261
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